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ABSTRACT:
With "novel" scientific discoveries accelerating at an unrelenting
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pace, the need for accessible and implementable standards for evaluating
the legal admissibility of scientific evidence becomes more and more
crucial. As science changes, legal standards for evaluating "novel" science
must be plastic enough to respond to fast-moving changes.
This,
ostensibly, was the Daubert objective. Since it was decided in 1993,
however, Daubert's impact has been hotly contested-with plaintiffs and
defendants each claiming the decision unfairly favors the other side. New
approaches are constantly suggested to deal with the perceived impact,
although there is no uniform consensus of exactly what that impact is.
Without accurate and demonstrable evidence of Daubert's effect, however,
the current ad hoc approach of suggesting new gatekeeping methods is at
best blind, and at worst, a partisan attempt to manipulate judicial decisionmaking.
This article reports on a retrospective meta-review of data
regarding the impact of Daubert on admissibility of scientific evidence, for
the first time (to my knowledge)-via a simple statistical perspective. This
method confirms other assessments (using different methodologies) which
conclude that allowing for short-term corrections post-Daubert,there is no
difference in outcome whether Frye or Daubert tests are used. Given that
entirely different standards were used in both cases-yet yield similar
results-one must acknowledge the possibility that both tests are
"scientifically" flawed. Further, empirical evidence and academic research
agree that judges now substitute their own mechanisms for evaluating
scientific evidence, in some cases applying neither Daubert nor the preexisting Frye test. The reasons are unclear-perhaps due to an instinctual
aversion to the muddied or flawed standards enunciated in both.
Nevertheless, it does appear that judges are uncomfortable understanding
several Daubert tests including the "falsification" criterion, which is the
foundation stone of the Daubert analysis.
Via reanalysis of the RAND study of 2001 which examined effects
of Daubert, this research further highlights the scientific/mathematical
illiteracy of the current legal community (especially, as I demonstrate,
compared to judges pre-Frye). This situation presents a major obstacle for
devising a workable method for judicial gatekeeping of scientific evidence.
Ultimately, however, lawyers and scientists must first agree what "science"
is before better methods of evaluating proffered evidence can be devised.
It is suggested that lawyers turn to scientists who developed the scientific
method as it applies to the science of the courtroom-biology, chemistry
and simple physics to enlighten themselves-and substitute these
approaches for the flawed and faulty premises advocated by Daubert and
Frye.
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Once, upon decisions bleary
As one side cheered-the other teary
Judges pondered, weak and weary,
And seven robed men1 succumbed to eerie
Pseudo-Scientific thee-ery,
Committing legal Hara-kiri.
Spouting Popper'sview of science:
Test byfalsification-Hisis not reliance
On objective verifiance,
Observationsand compliance
With scientific methods and peer alliance.
So now the time has come to raise Defiance!
Quothe the Maven: NEVERMORE!

I. THE COMMON WISDOM OF DAUBERT'S IMPACT-DEBUNKED
A. Introduction: The Need for Science and Law to Talk the Same Language
The story of Lorenzo's Oil2 portrays a family searching for a
remedy for their son's rare neurological illness. Clashing with "organized
medicine," they find an oil which miraculously improves Lorenzo's
condition. Controlled scientific studies, however, failed to confirm the
oil's effectiveness in treating the disease.
The debate between empirical evidence and case reports rages on,
impacting liability determination, allocation of research funding and choice
of treatment. Novel biotechnologies bring novel questions, including what
constitutes proper medical practice or effective care. Resolution of these
matters turns on laboratory data and clinical trials in medicine, consensus
of opinion in the bioethical community, and expert testimony in courts of
law.
Most law courts turn to formulations set forth in the Supreme Court
cases of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,3 General Electric
Co. v. Joiner,4 and the Federal Rules of Evidence to assess the propriety of

1 Justices Rehnquist and Breyer dissented on the key portions.
2

Lorenzo's Oil: The Full Story (BBC television documentary July 21, 2004), available at

http://news.bbc .co.uk/2/hi/health/3907559.stm.
3 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
4 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
5 See FED. R. EVID. 702, 104 (outlining rules for testimony by expert witnesses and
preliminary questions).
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expert testimony. The predicates of their admissibility criteria turn on
whether the proffered evidence is based on (1) "reliable" scientific
research, (2) is conducted by the "scientific method," and (3) is predicated
on "science." 6
These determinations are entrusted to the judge, as
"gatekeeper." Thus, before a judge can allow a jury to consider proffered
"scientific" evidence, he or she must understand what constitutes sound
"scientific research." Even before that determination is made, however, we
must all agree on a definition of "science." Should the legal definition of
"science" (and its practice) as detailed in Daubert differ from its
understanding by scientists, we should expect to find serious scientific
errors creeping into legal resolutions-as indeed has occurred. It is no
surprise, then, some studies indicate that gatekeepers have simply
substituted their own methods for evaluating evidence, rather than relying
9
on standards set forth in Daubert,which to them are incomprehensible.
This problem can be illustrated by comparing a thermometer with a
Celsius metric to convey the determination of "freezing point" in a culture
tethered to the Fahrenheit system. Both are valid systems-but they cannot
simply be transposed. Without a "common denominator" translating the
"legal" (i.e., the Daubertian) definition of sciencel ° and the scientific
6 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 138 (holding no abuse of discretion when trial court concluded
insufficient basis for expert opinion); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 ("In order to qualify as 'scientific
knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method."); FED. R. EVID.
702(a)-(b) (stating expert testimony must be "scientific ... knowledge" based on sufficient facts
or data).
7 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (discussing gatekeeping role of judge to screen scientific
evidence).
8 See A. Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique and Interpretation:What EmpiricalStudies Tell Us
About the Application of Daubert, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 143 (2005) ("For example, scholars
have taken issue with some judges' interpretation of Daubertas requiring epidemiological data or
specifically epidemiological data that demonstrates a doubling of risk."); see also Manko v.
United States, 636 F. Supp. 1419, 1434 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (memorializing this error).
9 See Vickers, supra note 8, at 143 (suggesting judges may not have sufficient understanding
of reliability factors or how to apply them); LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE, CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL
CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION 40 (2001) [hereinafter RAND STUDY], available at

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph reports/2005/MR1439.pdf
(finding
judges increasingly used non-Daubertreliability factors over time); see also Daubert,509 U.S. at
600-01 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some
gatekeeping responsibility... But I do not think it imposes on them either the obligation or the
authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform that role.").
10 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-93. The Court in Daubert misunderstood "falsifiability," as
used in science, and commingled scientific concepts of "reliability" and "validity" into a
hodgepodge-mishmash called "legal reliability." See id. at 590 n.9 ("[T]he difference between
accuracy, validity, and reliability may be such that each is distinct from the other by no more than
a hen's kick."). Few cases clearly differentiate between the two. Judge Joan Gottschall's
evaluation of entrance exams used to hire Chicago firefighters is illustrative of the importance of
the distinction. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, No. 98 C 5596, 2005 WL 693618, at *1-*12 (N.D.
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definition of science (which, by the way, differs depending on the field of
science involved), 1 confusion reigns.
Many commentators distance
Daubert's impact by focusing on the supersedence of Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.12 Nevertheless, even a superficial reading of
the rule indicates that its roots lie in Daubert and its shoots reflect the
Supreme Court's reasoning. 13 Thus, even the ambit of the Federal Rules
has not curtailed ensuing judicial activism 1resulting
from the confused state
4
of affairs, in a vain attempt at compliance.

Ill. Mar. 2005), rev'd, 528 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 560 U.S. 205 (2010). Differentiating
between the tests' undisputed statistical reliability and its disputed validity to assure nondiscrimination, Judge Gottschall noted that:
[E]ven if the 1995 Test could reliably measure what it was supposed to measure, it
could not distinguish between those who were qualified for the position of CFD
firefighter and those who were not. . . . [thus] it is not clear that the 1995 Test
measures what it is supposed to measure ... [which] undermines the 1995 Test's
utility as a valid measure of candidates' relative cognitive skills ....
Although the
test scores are known, there is no actual evidence of a correlation between those
test scores and job performance [i.e., its validity].
Id. at *1, *9, *10, *12 (emphasis added); see also Letter from Joan Gottschall, Judge of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, to author (Oct. 13, 2004) [hereinafter October
Letter from Judge Joan Gottschall] (on file with author). In her note, Judge Gottschall expressed
appreciation for being given an understanding of scientific terms and noted that her new-found
understanding between the difference of scientific validity and reliability assisted her in rendering
the decision. See October Letterfrom Judge Joan Gottschall,supra ("I'm enclosing a copy of the
opinion I was beginning to work on immediately after the seminar. I think you'll see
immediately how handicapped I would have been without understanding the concepts of
reliability and validity."); see also Letter from Judge Gottschall, Judge of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, to author (Aug. 30, 2005) (on file with the author)
(expressing similar sentiments).
11 See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 50-51 (4th ed. 2012)
("An investigator who hoped to learn something about what scientists took the atomic theory to
be asked a distinguished physicist and an eminent chemist whether a single atom of helium was
or was not a molecule.... For the chemist the atom of helium was a molecule because it behaved
like one with respect to the kinetic theory of gases. For the physicist ... the helium atom was not
a molecule because it displayed no molecular spectrum. Presumably both men were talking about
the same particle, but they were viewing it through their own research training and practice.
Their experience in problem-solving told them what a molecule must be.").
12 See Michael D. Green & Joseph Sanders, Admissibility Versus Sufficiency: Controllingthe
Quality of Expert Witness Testimony in the United States (Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies &
Univ.
of
Houston
Law
Ctr.,
Paper
No.
2016468,
2015),
available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016468 (arguing courts are moving away from Daubert-factoranalysis
and toward sufficiency analysis, reflected in Rule 702).
13 See FED. R. EVID. 702(c) ("A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if... (c) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.") (emphasis added).
14 See Vickers, supra note 8, at 133 (highlighting pattern of judicial behavior
regarding
evidential admissibility); discussion infra Part I.B. (explaining RAND Study data and judges'
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The ultimate objective of Daubert (and ensuing rules, discussions
and reviews), is to provide judges with transparent and easily accessible
tests to vet scientific evidence. 15 Before we can refine these tests, a clear
assessment of Daubert's effect is warranted. Since Daubert is grounded on
establishing that the proffered evidence is "scientific," we return to where
we started: We must assure that we are all using the same definition of
"science."
As I have previously put forth, the basic definition of "science" in
the legal world is predicated on misunderstanding certain scientific
concepts and inapt use of philosophical views of science. 16 Accordingly, I
argue that the (Daubert) foundation is flawed. If Daubert is indeed
influencing judicial decision-making, attempts at rectification must first
include a redefinition of "science" such that lawyers, judges and experts are
on the same page-which is often not the case.
B. Background: Daubertand Frye
In 1993, the case of Daubert pronounced that experts may only
testify on evidence considered "scientific." 1 7 The Daubert decision
replaced the earlier paradigm enunciated in the 1923 case of Frye v. United
States"8 which relied on the "general consensus of the scientific
community" to dictate admissibility.1 9
Both cases were ostensibly
triggered by a proffer of "novel" scientific evidence, which the judges felt
the then-existing standards of evaluation were insufficient.20
The effects of Daubert are hotly contested: Some claim Daubert
has overly excluded evidence; others claim Daubert relaxed standards of

conflicting uses of scientific data in court); see also Sophia I. Gatowski etal, Asking the
Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-DaubertWorld,

25 LAW & HuM.BEHAV. 433, 443 (2001) (finding majority of judges surveyed overwhelmingly
supported the "gatekeeping" role as defined in Daubert).
15 See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (explaining purpose of scientific inquiry).
16 See Barbara P. Billauer, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert: The Fatal
Flaws of Falsifiability and Falsification (Dec. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Billauer, Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence under Daubert], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2701737 ("The Daubert
mantra demands that judges, acting as gatekeepers, prevent para, pseudo or 'bad'science from
infiltrating the courtroom. To do so, the Judges must first determine what 'science' is? And then,
what 'good science' is?").
17 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
1 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
19 Id. at 1014.

20 See Daubert, 509

U.S. at 584 (considering expert testimony based

on animal,

pharmacological, and "reanalysis" of previously published epidemiological studies); Frye, 293 F.
at 1014 (introducing type of systolic blood pressure deception test).
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admissibility. 21 Both sides are adamant. This discourse is, of course,
predicated on the belief that Daubert effectuated a significant change in
evidentiary admissibility-either for good or for bad, depending on the bias
of the commentator.
The debate rages on. 22
A proliferation of
diametrically opposite opinions claiming that Daubert is notoriously antiplaintiff, 23 or pro-plaintiff-at least in civil cases-have surfaced.24
Recently, the duel began another round, this time accompanied by new
solutions to address the apparent imbalances. 25 These solutions are
attacked by those claiming the legal status quo adequately addresses the
situation.

26

It is hard to understand how the viewpoints could be so disparate if
the empirical evidence is so clear. Hence, before legal commentators take
their gloves off for another fencing match, I suggest that it behooves us to
re-check the original data: What does the data actually say? What exactly
did Daubert accomplish? Have legal commentators, relying on verbal
conclusions rather than hard data-been misled, and is this entire
tempest-illusory?

21

Compare Green & Sanders, supra note 12 (claiming Daubert decision "has led to the

exclusion of experts in hundreds, perhaps thousands of cases"), with Cassandra H. Welch, Note,
Flexible Standards, DeferentialReview: Daubert's Legacy of Confusion, 29 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1085, 1086 (2006) (arguing flexible approach to admissibility has led to confusing
standards by which courts evaluate evidence).
22 Compare Jeffry D. Cutler, Implications of Strict Scrutiny of Scientific Evidence: Does
Daubert Deal a Death Blow to Toxic Tort Plaintiffs?, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 189, 191-92
(1995) (arguing liberalization of standard for admissibility makes recovery less likely for typical
toxic tort plaintiff), with Paul M. Barrett, Justices Rule Against Business in Evidence CaseRestrictive Standardfor Use of Scientific Testimony in Trials Is Struck Down, WALL ST. J., June
29, 1993, at A3 (characterizing Daubert as pro-plaintiff decision).
23 See RAND STUDY, supra note 9, at xvi (finding that challenges to expert evidence became
increasingly fatal to cases). According to Brian Gill, "[t]he 2001 RAND study found that 90% of
the courtroom uses of Frye and Daubert was anti-plaintiff." LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL,
RAND CORP., RESEARCH BRIEF: CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT
EVIDENCE
(2002)
[hereinafter
RAND
RESEARCH
BRIEF],
available
at

http://www.rand.org/pubs/research briefs/RB9037 (describing 2001 RAND Study).
24 See Vickers, supra note 8, at 128-37 ("Despite criticisms that Daubert tightened
admissibility standards, the decision itself appeared to liberalize the standard by demoting general
acceptance to one of five factors to be considered. . . . Nevertheless, the actual effect of the
decision has been largely to the contrary ....
As a result of Daubert challenges to admissibility,
rates of exclusion increased significantly after 1993 in civil cases.").
25 See Green & Sanders, supra note 12, at 22 (proposing that scientific evidence without
expert testimony is insufficient to create reasonable inference of causation).
26 See Aaron D. Twerski & Lior Sapir, Sufficiency of the Evidence Does Not Meet Daubert
Standards: A Critique of the Green-Sanders Proposal, 23 WIDENER L.J. 641, 641 (2014)
("[W]hat courts have been doing by purporting to follow the dictates of Daubert is deciding
issues of admissibility with little regard for the Daubert criteria, but rather based on the
sufficiency of the evidence to infer a causal connection and the harm alleged.").
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C. MisunderstandingThe RAND Report and Other EmpiricalEvidence
Three studies have meticulously gathered and analyzed empirical
evidence about the effects of Daubert through 1998.2 Other work has
discussed these results drawing various apt-and inapt-conclusions. 2 8
One impressive study compared judicial opinions between 1991
and 1998 and reported that "one-third of the judges in 1998 said they
admitted expert evidence less often than they did before Daubert...
Judges in 1998 permitted 59% of cases to proceed to trial without
limitation on the evidence compared to a 75% rate taken in an earlier
survey. 29 One commentator noted that in the Third Circuit exclusion rates
spiked to "70% between mid-1995
and mid-1996, up from 53% for the two
30
Daubert.
preceding
years
This data seems to solidly sustain the claim that following Daubert,
judges both more carefully reviewed scientific evidence and more
frequently excluded scientific evidence.3 1 On the surface, one might say
27

See RAND

STUDY,

supra note 9, at 12; Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney

Experiences, Practices and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 309, 311-12 (2002) [hereinafter FJC Study] (describing method of
survey wherein federal court judges were polled about experience with expert evidence); Jennifer
L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and
Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 339, 342-43 (2002) [hereinafter Groscup
Study] (studying over 2,000 appellate court cases over span of eleven years).
28 See Christopher R. Grivas & Debra A. Komar, Kumho, Daubert, and the Nature of
Scientific Inquiry: Implicationsfor Forensic Anthropology, 53 J. OF FORENSIC SCI. 771, 771-76
(2008) (examining impact Daubert and other cases had on forensic anthropology); Joe S. Cecil,
Ten Years of Judicial Gatekeeping Under Daubert, 95 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 574, 575 (2005)
("A recent analysis by the RAND Corporation of a sample of 399 published and unpublished
federal district court decisions appearing in the Westlaw database over a 20-year period indicates
the extent to which courts have shifted toward excluding proffered scientific and technical
evidence."); Joseph Sanders, Shari S. Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Legal Perceptionsof Science and
Expert Knowledge, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 139, 141 n. 13 (2002) (noting early on, plaintiffs
and defendants attempted to spin Daubert in their direction, but ultimately "in practice the
Daubert test has been more restrictive than Frye."); Sophia Gatowski, supra note 14, at 443
(discussing her survey results of understanding of Daubert criteria by 400 state court trial judges).
29 FJC Study, supra note 27, at 330; RONALD ROESCH, PATRICIA A. ZAFPT & STEPHEN D.
HART, FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 308 (2009) (discussing data of the FJC Study).
30 Vickers, supra note 8, at 126-27 (citing RAND STUDY, supra note 9, at xvi).
31

See sources cited supra notes 27-28 (supporting the assertion that expert evidence was

excluded more frequently following Daubert). Interpreting the FJC study to support the claim
that Daubert favored defendants falls prey to the infirmities of Daubert, i.e., that carefully
constructed standards are not set forth for interpretation of data leading to misleading, or even
erroneous conclusions. See FJC Study, supra note 27, at 330. This issue also exemplifies the
objectives of Joiner-thatthe conclusion must flow from the methodology (i.e., the study design).
See id. Thus, the conclusions generated from the FJC results must relate to the study question,
and hence we must ask: What was the FJC study designed to test? If it was to determine whether
there was a change in judicial approach immediately after the time period of 1991-1993, a time
when "junk- science" overran and drowned the courts, the study was properly designed to
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this means Daubert favors defendants. 3 2 If this is the case, then the matter
is open and shut; Daubertdid what it was supposed to do-and in so doing
favored defendants.
Or perhaps it isn't so simple. Perhaps these studies and their
interpretations exemplify exactly what is wrong with the current
situation-inadequacy of basic scientific and mathematical education of
today's lawyers (and judges) prevents any ability to critically assess or
understand scientific or mathematical evidence, thereby questioning their
ability to present scientific testimony to the courts in any manner capable
of being evaluated.33
As I will show, the conclusion of the RAND data (relied on by
those claiming Daubert favors defendants), is not supported by the data,
and is in fact wrong.3 4 Dead wrong. Unless, that is, all we want to
measure are two snapshots in time-1991-1993 and 1995-1997. But there
is a whole lot more going on than those numbers represent. A careful
review of the underlying data-at least the data which is presenteddemonstrates that we are entirely off track, and that all the hundreds of law
reviews, articles and reports devoted to bettering Daubert, 3furthering
5
Daubert, and curtailing Daubert,I suggest, have been for naught.
This rigorous review is long overdue, and given the battles of the

determine that fact, and obtain reliable results. It showed, compared to the time period
immediately before and after Daubert, that there was a difference-one favoring the defendants
(or if you will, correcting the aberrant all-welcoming attitude prior to Daubert where just about
anyone professing just about anything was allowed to testify). As to why this is a valid question
and an important finding, see infra section II.A., discussing the RAND Study data and its
misleading conclusions. However, to generalize from the FJC study that as a general premise
Daubert favors defendants, oversteps the bounds of the study and illustrates the dangers of
extrapolating backwards beyond the study limits; a practice sure to generate invalid and
erroneous conclusions. By contrast, the RAND study was designed to address precisely that
question, i.e., the effect of Daubert overall, beginning from a baseline time period of 1980-1989
and not merely relating to post-1991 changes. See RAND STUDY, supra note 9 at xiii.
Notwithstanding the authors' verbal conclusion, the data showed it did not. See discussion infra
section II.A.
32 Thus, whether Daubert influenced the judiciary to favor defendants after 1991 does not
mean that Daubert favors defendants as a general proposition, as will be discussed in great depth
in the next section. See discussion infra section II.A. Nor does it answer the question-for how
long after 1991 did Daubert influence judges to favor defendants? The assumption that it
continued throughout the study (or until the present time) is patently invalid, although it is
entertained by virtually all legal commentators.
33 See Margaret B. Kovera & Bradley D. McAuliff, The Effects of Peer Review and Evidence
Quality on Judge Evaluations of Psychological Science: Are Judges Effective Gatekeepers?, 85 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 574, 575 (2000) ("[R]esearch on methodological reasoning skills suggests
that judges may not be able to assess scientific validity accurately without additional training.").
34 See discussion infra section II.A. (demonstrating flaws in interpreting RAND graph data).
35 See discussion infra section II.A.-C. (arguing RAND Study interpretations are flawed, and
outcomes under Daubert and Frye are incredibly similar).
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legal experts on how to redress the perceived injustices of Daubert,appears
to be sorely needed. While the legal community has been remiss in this
delay, at least we can console ourselves; in the last year at least one book
and one significant law review article generated information (discussed in
the following sections) that sheds new light on matters which further
explains the anomalies between the data and the conclusions previously

reached.36
However, there is another imperative for this research: Over two
decades have passed since Daubertwas decided. In these twenty years we
have seen an explosion of toxic tort cases including those against
manufacturers of Zoloft, Paxil, Viagra, Thalidomide-even the ubiquitous
Tylenol, to name but a few.3 The current case management tool of Multi38 District Litigation (MDL) helps foster greater uniformity in rulings
thereby reducing conflicting opinions, and curtailing Supreme Court
review. As time goes on, more complex chemicals, pharmaceuticals and
bionic implants are being developed-with the potential to cause both good
and harm, cure disease and instigate more lawsuits. As an administrative
tool, MDL is undoubtedly beneficial. But an unanticipated side-effect of
fewer divergent holdings-the predicate for Daubert and its progeny
(Joinerand Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichae139 rulings in the first place-is
that we are less likely to see Supreme Court intervention: In this light,
determining whether the Daubert paradigm and its reasoning are valid,
effective, and partisan, must fall to academia.
II. THE WHY AND HOW OF FRYE AND DAUBERT: SO WHAT'S THE
ISSUE?
The Daubert case concerned the admissibility of epidemiological
evidence to demonstrate that an increased risk of birth defects was caused

36 See discussion infra section II.D. (reviewing Fisher's book, cited infra note 109);

discussion infra section II.F. (analyzing backstory of Frye, as detailed in Lepore article, cited
infra note 45).
37 See Catherine R. Borden et al., CentripetalForces: Multidistrict Litigation and Its Parts,
75 LA. L. REv. 425, 433 n.23 (2014). "These are obviously large proceedings . ..including
Asbestos, Diet Drugs, Prempro, Niotal, Welding Fumes, Vioxx, and Seroquel proceedings as well
as the following: In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 69 Pa. D. &
C.4th 320 (19th. 2003); In re Silica ProductsLiability Litigation, 398 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex.
2005) - MDL No. 926; In re Ortho Evra Products Liability Litigation, 422 F. Supp. 2d 1379
(J.P.M.L. 2006); In re Aredia & Zometa Products Liability Litigation,MDL No. 1760, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 43433 (M.D. Tenn., 2008)." Id.
38 See id. at 432 ("[F]our disposition codes ... account for 96% of the cases before the [multi
district] Panel. In other words, a relatively small number of cases on the Panel's docket are not
centralized ...").
39 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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by the anti-nausea medication, Bendectin. 40 By contrast, in Frye, the use of
systolic blood pressure was proffered as a "novel" measure of veracity of a
witness, the expert witness claiming to be the first "to have perfected a
device or means of measuring and recording the blood pressure to such an
extent that with the aid of this device could detect deception.,

41

The Frye

court rejected the claim and excluded the evidence, a clear legal (and
scientific) no-brainer.42
On its face, the "science" behind the expert's opinion in Frye was
sorely lacking. But rather than dissecting the science (as was the practice of
previous courts),43 the Court resorted to pablumatic dicta (i.e., "reliance on
the consensus in the scientific community"). 44 Thus, even as Daubert is
heralded as the "new mantra" of legal admissibility, the ghost of Frye still
hangs heavy on the courts: Frye is still good law in eight jurisdictions at
last count (although the number is constantly changing) along with the
District of Columbia, for good reason.45

40

It gives Judges the comfort of

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993).

41 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013-14 (1923). The issue still plagues the courts. See
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A

PATH FORWARD 88-89 (2009) (citing commentary to Federal Rules of Evidence 700 and 702).
The controversy over lie detector tests is a modern offshoot of Frye. Id. Other variants of
physiological measures claimed to represent changes in psychological states such as measurement
of sound wave changes in a person's voice when alleged to be lying, on the theory that
constriction of the muscles of the larynx is a manifestation of "tension" associated with telling
untruths, likely will face similar scrutiny. See Jeffrey J. Walczyk et al., Advancing Lie Detection
by Inducing Cognitive Load on Liars: A Review of Relevant Theories and Techniques Guided by
Lessons from Polygraph-Based Approaches, FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY (Feb. 1, 2013),
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00014 (discussing
new
"truth-telling"
measurement
approaches prompted by reservations raised in National Research Council report). "The
technology of voice analysis has been developed over the last 30 years mainly to improve
methods of investigation .... [Lie detector glasses] track and analy[ze] the mechanics of vocal
patterns to identify emotional states such as excitement, stress, uncertainty and deception. The
software can run on variety of computer systems, including laptops for portable use wherever
security is a concern." Mike Hanlon, Lie Detector Glasses Tell You if Someone is Telling the
Truth, GIZMAG (Jan. 9 2004), http://www.gizmag.com/go/2530.
42 See Fye, 293 F. at 1014 (excluding systolic blood pressure test).
43 See discussion infra section II.E. (discussing change in expert qualifications over time).
44 See 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY §§ 1-3.0 (2d ed. 2001). Frye does not require that judges "have

any facility with scientific methods to make the admissibility decision," but only mandates that
they develop "some basis for knowing what [it is that] most scientists believe." Id. at § 1:7.
45 See Jill Lepore, On Evidence: ProvingFrye as a Matter of Law, Science, and History,
124
YALE L.J. 1092, 1140-42 (2015) (articulating influence of Frye on rules of evidence); Martin S.
Kaufman, The Status of Daubert in State Courts, ATL. LEGAL FOUND. 1-3 (2006),
http://www.atlanticlegal.org/daubertreport.pdf (listing states adopting and/or rejecting Daubert).
Along with the District of Columbia, states still following Frye include: California, Illinois,
Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey (although it is only applied to criminal cases), New York,
Pennsylvania, and Washington. See, e.g., People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 327-28 (Cal. 1994)
(holding Kelly/Frye approach is appropriate and survives Daubertin California); U.S. v. Jenkins,
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being able to rely on the science of the day-that is, science as accepted by
the majority of the scientific community-without resorting to independent
analysis. By pronouncing the "general acceptance test," judges are able to
reject questionable theories of experts without articulating a reason.
By comparison, Daubert did not come without benefit.
It
unshackled judges from being bound by rigid adherence to the scientific
status quo. However, it also imposed burdens-i.e., understanding the
principles of science and the scientific method-for which Judges were, by
and large, unprepared. 6 The new paradigm resulted in an overwhelming
plethora of law review articles 4 and, an immediate-but short lived-seachange in rulings.4 8 For the most part, this was based on the court's
difficulty in distinguishing "the real stuff' from "pseudo-pscience" [sic] or
advocatorial misuse of irrelevant science.4 9 Nevertheless, the concept
"novel science" as commonly understood in science, 5 0 was a red herring in
the legal arena, as most issues presented to courts (and certainly the one
raised in Daubert) are ones with long histories-both in science and law.
And it is this excuse that bears examination.
A. Through the Looking Glass: A Reanalysis of the RAND Study Data
In the years following Daubert, as mentioned earlier, studies

877 A.2d 1013, 1021 (D.C., 2005) (confirming Frye is the applicable standard); In re
Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184, 1188 (Ill. 2004) (observing admission of expert
testimony is governed by standard expressed in Frye); Burral v. State, 724 A.2d 65, 80 (Md.
1999) (holding Maryland has not abandoned Frye/Reed in favor of standards set forth in FRE
702); Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 810 (Minn. 2000) (applying Frye-Mack standard to
determine admissibility of novel scientific evidence); State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d 596, 621 (N.J.
1997) (stating Daubert has applied to toxic tort cases; test in criminal cases remains general
acceptance); People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 453-54 (N.Y. 1994) (applying Frye test to affirm
admissibility of DNA profiling evidence); Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1044 (Pa.
2003) (concluding Frye rule will continue to be applied in Pennsylvania); State v. Copeland, 922
P.2d 1304, 1314 (Wash. 1996) (holding Frye and evidence rules co-exist as law of Washington).
But see Smith v. State, 880 A.2d 288, 304 n.12 (Md. 2005) ("Maryland has not rejected the
Daubert standard, leaving to case-by-case development whether and to what extent Daubert may
apply here.").
46 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 41, at 90-97 (describing judiciary responses
to
admissibility of forensic evidence).
47 See Twerski, supra note 26, at 641. Twerski and Sapir found 3,929 results in the Westlaw
database for "Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals"with the search limited to "Secondary
Sources, Law Reviews and Journals." Ild.
48 See id. Some claim no sea-change occurred: "A review of case law after Daubert shows
that the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule. Daubert did not work a
,sea change over federal evidence law'...." FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
49 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
50 See KUHN, supra note 11, passim (discussing philosophy of science as it applies
to
novelties and new discoveries).
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evaluated its effects and articles discoursed on their findings. '1 Of the
empirical studies, arguably the RAND study was the most data-packed,
and according to its authors, "shows . ..judges addressed the issue of
reliability more often-and found evidence unreliable more often-after
the Daubert decision and up through mid-1997. In subsequent years, those
same proportions fell.",52 The reversal probably came about because
plaintiffs and defendants began to tailor the evidence that they proposed,
the authors claim, to comport with the Daubertrequirements. 53
Certainly, the claim that following Daubert, reliability was both
addressed and found unreliable more often than it was pre-Daubert, is
accurate-but it is horribly misleading. 4 When viewed in the harsh light
of history-over a longer duration rather than as a "snapshot in time,"
Daubert has made no difference! Looking ten years out on both sides of
the "Daubertevent," statistically speaking, nothing changed. It is this fact
that I will demonstrate here and therefore, ask1. On what is the apparent perception of change based-i.e., how
could we have gotten things so wrong?
2. What accounted for the radical pendulum shift immediately
following Daubert?

3. If the two standards (Daubertand Frye) are so different-how
do we explain the similarity (indeed the almost identical
nature) of effects over a twenty year period?
4. Are Daubert and Frye valid and feasible methods to evaluate
scientific evidence?
5. Or are both methods so flawed that we should start all over in
designing a paradigm for judicial gatekeeping?
The initial data sets in the RAND report were depicted in graphical form
with eight data points.
On its face, the first graph indicates an abrupt
increase in exclusion of scientific evidence in the four years following the
51 See sources cited supra note 27 and discussion Part I.C. (discussing FJC, RAND, and
Groscup studies). The FJC Study reported limiting or excluding expert testimony in 41% of 1998
cases, versus 25% of the cases referenced in the 1991 survey. See FJCStudy, supra note 27, at
322. In contrast to the RAND and FJC Studies, the Groscup Study found no change in rates of
admission at the trial and appellate court following Daubert. See Groscup Study, supra note 27,
at 363. This finding is said to be the result of differences between the criminal and civil settings,
and may be complicated by the fact that investigators only reviewed cases on appeal. See id. at
364-65.
52 RAND RESEARCH BRIEF, supra note 23.

53 See id.
54 See FJC Study, supra note 27, at 330 (surveying judges and finding expert evidence
admissible less often); RAND STUDY, supra note 9, at xvi (noting Third Circuit increase in
exclusion after Daubert); discussion infra (demonstrating flaws in interpreting RAND graph
data).
55 See infra Figures 1, 5. Reprinted with permission from the RAND Corporation.
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56
Daubert decision, before tapering off.

Figure 1. Frequency with which reliability addressed and
evidence found unreliable (case type, substantive area of evidence, and
appellate circuit held constant).
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RAND Figure 4.1. Reproduced with
permissionfrom the RAND Corporation.See
57
RAND STUDY, supra note 9, at 28.
A careful look at the data points, however, indicates they were
broken down into uneven time periods: 1980-89, 1989-91, 1991-93, 199395, 1995-96, 1996-97, 1997-98 and 1998-99, combining categorical data
(the first four sets) with more continuous data (the last four). 58 This
method of parsing data (in uneven time segments) is unconventional, if not
totally unacceptable-and would likely be rejected.
The graph can be recreated to account for this flawed approachassuming that within the eight discrete time periods there were no
changes. 5 9 Even with this correction, the RAND method of depicting the
data artificially skews the changes in admissibility over the years to look
much sharper as can be seen by the recreated graph below.60

56 See infra Figure 1.
57 It should be noted that RAND Figure 4.1, reprinted above, also appears in the RAND
Study as Figure S.1 on page at xv, but with a different caption: "Trends in challenges to
reliability of expert evidence (case type, substantive area of evidence, and appellate circuit held
constant)." See RAND STUDY, supra note 9, at xv, 28.
58 See supra Figure 1.
59 See infra Figure 2 (reformulating RAND chart).
60 Compare Figure 2 with Figure 1. Categorical data sets obscure (or smooth out) changes

over time. Utilizing two methods in one graph gives different weights to the data sets. See infra
Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Reformulated chart using data on a continuous basis.
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Series 1 (round dotted line) refers to evidence addressed for reliability; Series 2

(dashed line) refers to evidence found unreliable given reliability assessment; and
Series 3 (straight line) refers to evidence found unreliable for any reason, assuming
the evidence remained the same, between 1980 and 1989.
Extrapolatingbackward to 1980 (using the square dotted line), the changes in
admissibilitywithin the two decades does not appearas extreme as might be
assumedfrom looking at the RAND Graph, except for the sharp reduction in
evidence found unreliableafter 1997 (series 2).

When better formatted, the changes in admissibility immediately
prior and following Daubertdo reflect an increased incidence of
rejection-but hardly as abrupt as depicted in the RAND graphs. 6
However, when viewed over a twenty year time frame-as opposed to the
four years pre- and post-Daubert-we see that, comparing the years 1988
with 1998-the percent of evidence excluded actually decreased. 62
According to the RAND data provided, the results between 1980 through
1988 seemed to remain constant with an increase in evidence admitted
increasing sharply after 1988 until shortly before Daubert.63 Thus,

61 Compare Figure 2 with Figure 1 (reflecting more gradual change than RAND data).
62 See supra Figure 2 (reformulating RAND data).
63 See supra Figure 1.
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between 1980 and 1988, evidence was excluded approximately 70%
of the
64
time, while by 1998, it was excluded in about 60% of instances !
The authors' claim that more evidence was excluded following
Daubert "because plaintiffs and defendants began to tailor the evidence
that they proposed," simply does not hold up. 65 The data actually
demonstrates that in the decade 1980 to1989, only 30-40% of all evidence
was considered reliable. 6 6 Over the next few years-until 1993-the
percentage of evidence deemed reliable started creeping up.6 By 1991,
that proportion increased to 52%-and by the time Daubertreached the
68
Supreme Court in 1993, 65% of evidence submitted was deemed reliable.
In other words, in the short four-year time frame between 1989-1993, the
percentage of evidence considered admissible almost doubled, as can be
seen from the eight data points depicted in Figure 1 from the RAND
report. 69 What this means is that up to 1989, more probably than not,
scientific evidence would be excluded, while as of 1993, more probably
than not, scientific evidence would be admissible.
What remains unexplained is the sharp rise in the four-year period
immediately following Daubert,when the pendulum swung and more
evidence was excluded-until things returned to equilibrium after 1997. °
One possibility for the return to "normalcy" is that the influence of Daubert
on remand in the 9th Circuit71 actually evaluated the epidemiological
evidence using the approach newly formulated by the Supreme Court and
rejected it, thereby calming judicial activism. 72

64 See id.

65 See RAND RESEARCH BRIEF, supra note 23; Vickers, supra note 8, at 127 n.26 ("The
[RAND] authors interpret this data to reflect changing behavior by parties in response to the
tightening of standards, specifically inferring that 'parties proposing evidence either did not
propose or withdrew evidence not meeting the new standards, or better tailored evidence they did
propose to fit the new standards.' They also hypothesize that parties challenging evidence may
have been so encouraged by past success that they cast a wider net in terms of what evidence they
challenged, and hence the proportion of successful challenges may have dropped.").
66 See supra Figure 2 (reformulating RAND data).
67 See id.
61 See id.

69 See supra Figure 1.
70 See id.

71 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995) (on remand).
72 See Vickers, supra note 8, at 126-28 ("The success rate of these challenges increased as
well. It appears that judges were scrutinizing reliability more carefully, applying stricter
standards and, as a result, excluding an increasing proportion of evidence ....
[T]he researchers
found trends in successful challenges based on relevance and qualifications that paralleled that of
reliability, leading them to conclude that judges are scrutinizing testimony more carefully with
regard to all criteria. Interestingly, this trend changed in 1997, when the percentage of challenges
and their success rate started to decline. Post-1997, the study shows a gradual decrease in the
percentage of challenged evidence found unreliable.").
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B. The Pendulum Swings
As to the sharp increase following Daubert,"this can be easily
explained by the results of a recent study by Professors Cheng and Yoon..
•[which] affirm the hypothesis that Daubert'sprofound impacts have
resulted less from Daubert's actual doctrinal test and more from the fact
that the decision increased awareness of, and concern about, junk
science."' v In fact, Cheng and Yoon produce empirical evidence
supporting my observation and interpretation of the RAND data-that
whether one proceeds under Daubert or Frye-the results are essentially
the same. 74
Most Daubertdiscussion and disagreement concerns admissibility
of scientific evidence in products liability and toxic tort cases, although
scientific and technical experts are used in a myriad of other lawsuits.
Nevertheless, much of the Daubert controversy that finds its way to law
journals and the courts concerns toxic torts and products liability, and a
look at the exclusion statistics by case type is instructive.
Numerous graphs are presented in the RAND Report relating to
subject matter (e.g., health, engineering and technology, and physical
sciences), but these are not illuminating when it comes to admissibility
frequency. Eventually, at page 29, the Report does furnish the information
of interest-but for the first time in the report, the data is not in graph
format. 6 Rather, it is presented in tabular form, condensed into five data
points .
This presentation makes it extremely difficult to compare rulings in
products liability and toxic tort cases with cases overall, until it is

73 Id.at 135 ("Cheng and Yoon conclude that their study lends support to the theory that the

actual doctrinal test enumerated in Daubert is substantially less important than the awareness the
decision generated. They assert: The results of this study are consistent with the theory that the
power of the Supreme Court's Daubert decision was not so much in its formal doctrinal test, but
rather in its ability to create greater awareness about the problems of junk science ... [C]ourts
apply some generalized level of scrutiny when considering the reliability of scientific evidence,
regardless of the governing standard. If accepted, this thesis suggests that debates about the
practical merits and drawbacks of adopting a Frye versus a Daubert standard are largely
superfluous."); see also Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A
Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 472 (2005) (analyzing Daubert's
impact on state courts).
74 See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 73, at 511.
75 See Borden, supra note 37, at 431 ("There are almost as many cases in MDL No. 926 (In
re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation) in the database as there are cases
from all other non-product liability types of proceedings (air disaster, antitrust, and so on)
combined.").
76 See RAND STUDY, supra note 9, at 29.
77 See id.
at 29 tbl. 4.2 (reproduced as Figure 3, infra).
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reformulated in a comparable format:78 When this is done, comparison
with overall data (presented in Figures 1 and 2) is easier and yields
strikingly dissimilar results (see Figure 4). Immediately following
Daubert, the percentage of scientific evidence deemed reliable and
admissible increased!80

Figure 3. Proportion of challenged evidence in which reliability
addressed and found unreliable, by case type (predicted with
substantive area of evidence and geographic region held constant).
Opirnon Date
Case Ty7

__
A, Reiiab[ilyAddressed

N

1/J06f80

78993

7/93.6/95

7195-6/97

797-6199

Product liability arid toxic torts
I7
86
S0
78
90
92
64
61
35
47
93
Other B andiPD
65"*
19
34
16
59
111
Business 1rasactions
54
71*
58
49
62
210
Other
B. Evidence Found Unreliable
54
65
25
52
61
Product liabilit and toxic torts 187
74
66
49
51
39
93
Other BI and PD
33**
9
32**
2
2
111
Business transactions
20**
6
8*
23**
210
310*
Other
NOTE: Refcrince period used to calculat statistical significace of chnges is shaded. A single asterisk
(*) indicates that the difference from the reference period is staisticaly s-igniflcant at 10 percent; a double
asterisk (**) indicates that the difference from the reference period is statistically significant at 5
percent.

RAND Table 4.2. Reproduced with permissionfrom the RAND
Corporation. See RAND STUDY, supra note 9, at 29.

This trend continued before eventually reaching an admissibility
level slightly more than the 1980-89 level.81 Nevertheless, the bundling of
data in the table is troubling and obscures key information. For example,
1991-93, a time period where a large overall change occurred, is not broken
out separately-those years are amalgamated with 1989-91, softening out
the curve and possibly obscuring important information-such as the
alarming increase in "junk" science claimed to be admitted during those
82
years.

78 See id. (highlighting results reflecting reliability of evidence in various types of litigation).
Statistical significance appears not to have been reached in any of the product liability data,
although given the 50% change in the years 93-95, that is difficult to believe. See id. However,
should these results indicate that statistical significance has not been reached, the study-at least
as to products liability-would be unreliable, and hence inadmissible.
79 Compare supra Figures 1-2 with infra Figure 4. Since the data was bundled into five data
points, instead of the eight used in the earlier representations, the correspondence is not exact.
See id.
8o See infra Figure 4.
81 See supra Figure 3.
82 See supra Figure 3 and infra section lI.D. (discussing emergence of "junk science")
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Figure 4. The Daubert decision and the effect on products liability
cases.
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The straight line represents the percentage of cases where reliability was
assessed, and the dash line represents the percentage of cases where
evidence was excluded as unreliable.
However, overall the results are still startling: Compared to 198993 where 52% of scientific evidence in toxic tort cases was deemed
unreliable and excluded, after Daubert only 25% of challenged evidence
was deemed unreliable-i.e., the percentage of scientific evidence admitted
in the five years after Daubert in products liability cases nearly doubled
before correcting itself.84
By 1999, the percentage of challenged evidence deemed unreliable
had risen to 54%, a little lower than in the years between 1980-99. "
Comparing products liability rulings (above) with all rulings (below) we
find more interesting anomalies.8 6 However, it bears repeating that the
products liability data is broken down into five categorical data points of
uneven durations-smoothing out parts of the curve, making other sections
appear steeper than they otherwise might be, and making overall

83 The data by type of claim (Figure 3/RAND Table 4.2) is not categorized with the same
years as the earlier and later data.
84 See supra Figure 4.
85 See id.
86 Compare supra Figures 3 and 4 with infra Figure 5.
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comparison of results less precise and reliable, compared to the eight data
points of other graphs. 17
Figure 5. Percentage of evidence elements excluded (case type,
substantive area of evidence, and appellate circuit held constant).
Dauber oinion

-----------------------------

I
1/60-8/89 7/89-4/91

I
=

7191-M6(3

7/93--/95

I

II

,

,

7/95-/96

7/96-697 7/97-6/98
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RAND Figure 7.1. Reproduced with permissionfrom the RAND
Corporation. See RAND STUDY, supra note 9, at 55.
The relevancy statistics, too, are plagued with use of five data
points, instead of the eight used to evaluate reliability. 8 Nevertheless, the
overall results appear to be the same: Slightly more evidence was deemed
admissible and less was excluded afterl997-that is, after Daubertcompared to the years 1980-1989.' 9

87

See supra Figures 3 and 4 (using five categorical data points of uneven durations).

88 Compare infra Figure 6 with supra Figure 5.

89 See infra Figure 6.
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Fiure 6. Frequency with which relevance addressed and evidence found
irrelevant (case type, substantive area of evidence, and appellate circuit held
constant).
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RAND Figure 6.2. Reproduced with permissionfrom the RAND
Corporation. See RAND STUDY, supra note 9, at 50.
C. Interpretation:What Does It All Mean?
As noted earlier, Daubert and Frye take radically different
approaches regarding admissibility of "novel" science, yet the judicial
outcomes, at least over the long term, are incredibly similar. 90 One
explanation might be that during relevant time periods judges were using
neither Daubertnor Frye to make their decisions, a conclusion validated by
the RAND study and various commentators.9 1 We might consider it a form
of "non-differentiated" bias,9 2 a concept borrowed from epidemiology. 93

90 See discussion supra Part I.B. (discussing background of Daubert and Frye); see also
Cheng & Yoon, supra note 73, at 471 (reaching same conclusion via different methodology).
91 See Vickers, supra note 8, at 146-47; RAND STUDY, supra note 9, at xiii.
92 See Bias: Introduction, BOSTON UNIV.

SCH. OF PUB, HEALTH

(Mar. 30,

2015),

http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/MPH-Modules/EP/EP713 Bias/index.html.
"Bias refers to
systematic errors in any type of epidemiologic study that result in an incorrect estimate of the
association between exposures and outcomes." Id. "Nondifferential misclassification means that
the frequency of errors is approximately the same in the groups being compared.
Misclassification of exposure status is more of a problem than misclassification of the outcome.
A study may be biased by misclassification of either exposure status, or outcome status, or both."
Information Bias (Obervation Bias), BOSTON UNIV. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH (Mar. 30, 2015),
http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/MPH-Modules/EP/EP713 Bias/EP713 Bias4.html.
93 See KENNETH J. ROTHMAN, EPIDEMIOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 98 (2nd ed. 2002) (In

exposure misclassification, the misclassification is nondifferential if it is unrelated to the
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Since Daubertis not being followed-at least not uniformly or
across the board-obviously, it is useless and renders moot all the legal
articles "tweaking" Daubertto rectify its ostensible pro-plaintiff or prodefendant leanings. The finding also brings up three immediate questions:
1. What accounted for the short-term peri-DaubertChanges?
2. Why isn't Daubertbeing followed today?
3. Why wasn't Frye followed before Daubert?
To recapitulate, in the short-term post-Daubertperiod, the overall
percentage of evidence deemed inadmissible increased. 94 The increase
continued for about three to four years, rising sharply until 1997, before
plunging again to the levels which existed a decade earlier. 95 However, for
the three-year time frame prior to Daubert,the percentage of evidence
deemed admissible sharply rose. 9 6 While more evidence was evaluated for
admissibility after Daubert,by 1997 roughly the same percentage of
evidence was deemed admissible. 97 The percentage of cases where
scientific evidence was deemed admissible between 1980 and 1989 was in
the area of 80%. 9' In fact, comparing the years before 1989 to the period
post-1997, the percentage of evidence deemed admissible actually
increasedby about 10% !99
The RAND authors interpret this data in a vacuum, claiming that
the post-Dauberteffects were due to changes in the way evidence was
tailored by plaintiffs and defendants to suit the Supreme Court's new
directives. 100 Their interpretation is disputed-and is in fact contradicted
by their own findings. 101
I (and others) argue that the spike in evidentiary rejection in the
years preceding 1997 occurred because Daubert sounded a clarion cry that
evidence was being too hastily and inappropriately admitted in the period

occurrence or presence of disease; if the misclassification of exposure is different for those with
and without disease, it is differential. Similarly, misclassification of disease [outcome] is
nondifferential if it is unrelated to the exposure; otherwise, it is differential.").
94 See discussion supra Part II.B. and Figures 1-2 (illustrating increase in inadmissible
evidence four years following Daubert).
95 See discussion supra Part II.B. and Figures 1-2 (illustrating shift). The percentage of
evidence deemed admissible, given reliability assessment actually increased, compared to the
1980-89 time frame. Id.
96 See supra Figures 1-2 (indicating sharp increase in the years between 1990-93).
97 See id. (returning to 1993 levels by 1997).
98 See id.

99 See id.
100 See RAND RESEARCH BRIEF, supra note 23.
101 See Gatowski, supra note 14, at 433. Gatowski found that state court judges didn't even
understand many of the Daubert tests. Id. It appears judges are less than clear on the meaning of
falsifiability, Id.at 444. In telephone interviews with written follow-up, only 6% of 400 state
trial court judges gave answers that indicated a clear understanding of the notion. Id.
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immediately prior-rather than any implementation of the Daubert tests.102
In effect, then, Daubert merely effectuated a short-term course correction
to address an anomalous situation-before matters returned to the old
status quo. 0 3 Vickers claims that rather than the influence of tests
enumerated or suggested in Daubert,the short-term clamp-down was due
to increased cultural awareness of the importance of doing so:
Daubert has had a profound effect on the admissibility of
evidence but not via the means that most critics would
guess. In fact, Daubert's impacts appear to be the result
not of the doctrinal test set forth in the decision, but rather
of a cultural phenomenon either sparked by the decision, or
to which the decision has contributed. 104
Cheng and Yoon assert that Daubert'sinfluence was not from its
doctrinal reform, but from its educative function: "To the extent the
decision had a real effect on admissibility, it did so primarily by informing
judges that they should function as gatekeepers
to ensure that bad science
' 10 5
does not make its way into the courtroom."
But, if indeed Daubert sounded a sort of clarion call for judges to
"heed safety of scientific evidence," the question becomes-why? Why,
suddenly, in 1993 did judges need to be reminded to "keep bad science out
of the courtroom" ? 10 6 While Vickers, Cheng and Yoon claim that
education or judicial awareness was the key, they do not explain why
suddenly keys were needed. 107
102 See, e.g., Cheng & Yoon, supra note 73, at 503 (arguing influence of Daubert is not
doctrinal, but creating awareness of junk science); Vickers, supra note 8, at 144 (observing
impact of Daubert appears to be cultural shift toward scientific evidence).
103 See discussion and Figures 1-2 supra Part II.B. (noting sharp rise in excluded evidence
immediately after Daubert and returning to base-line equilibrium after 1997, assuming the years
1980-89 reflect baseline).
104 Vickers, supra note 8, at 110. "It appears that once judges started acting as more active
gate keepers, they more carefully examined relevance, qualifications, and other considerations for
admitting evidence, in addition to reliability." ld. at 126.
105 See id.(citing Cheng & Yoon, supra note 73, at 503).
106 As to why post-1997 evidentiary rulings revert to the pre-1989 levels, see supra note 72
(discussing trends Pre- and Post-1997). I suggest that after a short period of judicial crackdown
(1993-1997) plaintiffs' attorneys stopped introducing patently improper evidence-a practice that
in the years leading up to Daubert, was judicially sanctioned, causing more bad science to be
proffered, and more to be admitted. See discussion infra Part II.D. (discussing emergence of
"junk science"). The vicious pre-Dauben circle would continue until judges got the message that
this practice would not be tolerated by the Daubert holding. See id. and infra note 128
(discussing meeting with Chief Justice Rehnquist and concern about "junk science" in
courtroom).
107 See Cheng & Yoon, supra note 73, at 503 (asserting Daubert created awareness of junk
science); Vickers, supra note 8, at 147 (noting cultural shift toward greater skepticism of
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One intuitive answer is that in the years immediately prior to
Daubert an unusual amount of "bad science" was admitted. 0 8 Thus, only
if judges had been admonished not to let that happen-would we see such a
drastic change in results immediately following the Daubertdecision. This
hypothesis will be investigated in the following section.
D. From the Phoenix of Frye: Junk Law Emerges
Some years before Daubert,American courts began to be plagued
with an epidemic of toxic tort cases: Asbestos and Dalkon Shield, to name
the most notorious. 0 9 To be sure, drug companies and manufacturers had
demonstrated a history of abuse. 1 0 Partly, what inflamed the asbestos
litigation were reckless statements by company managers and reckless
conduct of the early manufacturers.1 1 And so, the toxic tort litigation
industry "took off." The public had been sensitized to cavalier
pronouncements by the "them that has" and were primed for revenge, and
the plaintiff's bar took advantage of this societal state of mind.
Enter the Silicone Breast Implantation cases.l12 While no
legitimate medical science ever substantiated any nexus between breast
implants and connective tissue disorders, by the early 1990s a juggernaut
was about to explode:
1) Several million anxious recipients of silicone devices, at
least one million of them with breast implants; 2) Six
thousand plaintiffs registered in state courts and four
thousand in federal courts, each one convinced she was the
unwitting victim of a defective product; 3) Virtually every
plastic surgeon in the nation co-named in one or more
implant suits; 4) Hundreds of plaintiff attorneys positioned

scientific evidence and educational function of decision).
108 See discussion infra II.D. (recounting emergence of "junk science").
109 See generally JACK C. FISHER, SILICONE ON TRIAL: BREAST IMPLANTS

AND THE

POLITICS OF RISK 205 (2015) (recounting controversial history of silicone breast implants);
BARBARA P. BILLAUER, Preparingfor Workplace Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH 687, 692 (Lawrence Slote 2d. ed. 1998) (mentioning asbestos cases).

110 See BILLAUER, Preparingfor Workplace Litigation, supra note 109, at 692.
111 See DONNA BYRNE, MEALEY'S LITIGATION REPORTER, ASBESTOS 982 (1984). On
September 12, 1966, E.A. Martin, the Director of Purchases for the Bendix Company (which used
asbestos in its products) wrote a letter to one of the principals at Johns-Mansville which was
widely circulated and the predicate for many punitive damages awards. Id. Martin wrote: "My
answer to the problem is: If you have enjoyed a good life working with asbestos products, why
not die from it? There has to be some cause." Id.
112 See FISHER, supra note 109, at 205 (recounting controversial history of silicone breast
implants).
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to receive a 30-40 percent share of any award they might
extract from a jury or a settlement conference; 5) Four
major corporations and soon a fifth facing mass tort peril..
[By] [s]eptember 1993 the four major implant
manufacturers

.

.

.

jointly announced that they had

collectively set aside 4.75 billion dollars to settle claims
filed over the next thirty years."'
But 1993 also brought good news for science and industry. At
least one defense lawyer named David Bernick understood the science and
had the savvy to convey it to a jury, and once he got involved the tide
turned. 114 Even before this, notable researchers had taken notice, and set
the stage by creating a maelstrom.11 5 Peter Huber wrote "Galileo's
Revenge" and coined the term "junk science."11 6 Marcia Angell, the editor
of The New England Journalof Medicine would publish Science on Trial,

where among other recommendations, she advocated raising the standards
18
for testimony.11 7 Steve Milloy would write Junk Science Judo."
In 1997
Peter Huber, now joined with Kenneth Foster, again reiterated his position
in a new book (avidly supporting the Daubert requirements).11 9 But not
until 2015 did Jack Fisher compile the detailed history of the Silicone
Breast Implant litigation, laying bare the key factors that brought down the
industry, and in the process, cataloging the explosion and proliferation of
judicially-approved "junk science." 120

113

Id.

114 See id. at 210 (discussing Bernick's success litigating highly complex scientific issues).
115 See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

220-32 (1988) (arguing for replacement of most tort liability with contractual principles).
116 See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 2-3
(1993) (focusing on how "junk science" has invaded courts).
117 See MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND LAW
IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 111-32 (1997) (warning of widening gap between scientific

reality and what is presented in court).
118 See STEVEN MILLOY, JUNK SCIENCE JUDO: SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST HEALTH SCARES
1 (2001). The Fox News "Junk Science commentator" who runs a web site,
junkscience.com, dedicated to "debunking" what Milloy labels "faulty scientific data and
analysis." See JUNK SCIENCE, http://junkscience.com/about (last visited Oct. 29, 2015).
AND SCAMS,

119

See

KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER,

KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 12, 17 (1997).

JUDGING

SCIENCE:

SCIENTIFIC

The author points out that there are

numerous issues with Foster's and Huber's understanding of "forensic scientific evidence,"
indicating a lack of appreciation of the nuances of either law, science-education or
biology/chemistry, i.e., the sciences of the courtroom. See Billauer, Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence under Daubert,supra note 16.
120 See FISHER, supra note 109, at 205 (recounting controversial history of silicone breast
implants).
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Among Fisher's key points is that in the few years leading up to
1993, admission of testimony was based on an attitude of judicial laissezfaire; expert testimony from just about anyone the plaintiffs chose to
designate as such was admitted-even
persons without relevant training,
121
credential or experience.
The importance of experts as an influence on juries is summed up
by Fisher:
Attorneys for both plaintiff and a defendant understand the
influence that any expert witness can exert on the opinions
of jurors, whether or not the testimony is legitimate. Juries
are easily confused whenever distinctions between
authentic and false expertise are cloudy. The typical juror
is particularly vulnerable to hindsight bias, meaning a
tendency to judge prior incidents according to a known
outcome.... in cases of toxic exposure the easiest decision
is to link the reported effect with the alleged cause,
especially when a phony expert is brought forward to
promote the notion. All valid scientific evidence to the
contrary is more than likely rejected. Only a judge is in a
position to control hindsight bias by ensuring the highest
standard of evidence offered at trial. 122
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert,Judge Robert
Jones, faced with Hall v. Baxter Healthcare,123 became the first judge to
appoint a panel of experts to advise the court in breast implant cases. 124
These included a polymer chemist, an immunologist, a rheumatologist and
an epidemiologist. 125 By this time, there was a vast array of literature to
review-and the expert panel concluded that "any theory supporting a
claim of alleging linkage between breast implants and any autoimmune
disease was at best an untested hypothesis." 126 Accordingly, many of the
plaintiff's stable of experts were now declared judicial persona non grata
and their testimony was now ruled inadmissible in some jurisdictions, but

121
122

See id.at 222.
Id. at 222 (citing Debra L. Worthington et al., Hindsight Bias, Daubert and the Silicone

Breast Implant Litigation:Making the Casefor Court-appointedExperts in Complex Medical and
Scientific Litigation, 8 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 154 (2000)).
123 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).
124 See FISHER, supra note 109, at 236-37.
125 See id.
126 Id. at 225.
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the aggressive practice of using unqualified experts continued. 127 By 1993
128
the Supreme Court got the message: Something needed to be done.
E. What's an Expert-and When Did It Change?
Given the importance of vetting expert witnesses, one wonders
what the RAND study data shows regarding Daubert'seffects on
admissibility of scientific experts based on qualifications during the
critical time period of the Silicone Breast Implant cases-and specifically,
were there any changes in the level of qualifications of experts? The
answer to the second question-is nothing. In other words, while both
questions were investigated, we are never given a clear answer to the
second.
To be sure, the RAND data did provide overall information, noting
that following Daubert, courts increased consideration of expert
qualifications. 129 Interestingly, the data also showed that the percentage of
experts deemed unqualified to testify for any reason remained almost
constant from 1980 through 1999, actually decreasinga bit from 5% to
about 3%! 130 As to experts deemed unqualified to testify based on
qualifications-this percentage decreasedfrom 20% in 1980 to 13% twenty

years later!131

127
128

See id. (describing effects of expert panel on plaintiff's expert witnesses).
See Personal meeting with William Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the

United States, and Dr. Norman Bailey, President, Inst. for Global Econ. Growth, Supreme Court
Chambers, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 2003). In the wake of Daubert, Chief Justice Rehnquist was
extremely concerned about junk science in the courts and the general ignorance of science
amongst judges, prosecutors and lawyers in general. Ild. He was supportive of programs
designed to instruct the judiciary in the scientific method. Id. The purpose of the meeting was to
introduce him to a novel method of teaching science to the judiciary, which was the purpose of
the Foundation for Law and Science Centers, Inc. (FLASC), of which Barbara Billauer was
founder and president, Dr. Norman Bailey was treasurer and vice president, and of which Judge
Paul Michel and Professor Leon Lederman were Chairmen at the time. Id. The discussion
centered on the format of the new method of teaching judges which was devised by the author
and which was subsequently patented. See id; Method & Sys. for Providing Interactive Legal
Training, U.S. Patent No. 20070048720 (issued Mar. 1, 2007), available at
http://patents.justia.com/patent/20070048720.
129 See RAND STUDY, supra note 9, at 50-52 (displaying data graphically in Figures 6.1-.4).
The data set inconsistency and incongruity manifests here as well. See id. Every data presented
in graph form has five points; the decade prior to 1989 comprises one set, a four year interval
from 1989-1993 is the second data point, and thereafter three two-year interval data points. Id.
As stated before, this method of categorization weights certain data points more heavily than
others, smooths the curves and obscures critical data. See discussion supra Part II.B. and note 60.
130 See infra Figure 7 (reproducing Figure 6.3 from RAND STUDY, supra note 9, at 51).
131 See id. The use of the phrase "given qualifications addressed" is not clear. See id. In
typical statistical language it could mean, assuming that all qualifications were the same-and
thus qualifications were not the deciding factor; alternatively, it could mean that the data
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Of most interest in light of the Silicon Breast Implant cases was
whether Daubertresulted in changes in level of training and type of expert
credentials. Significant by its omission, the RAND study does not tell us.
The nature of expert qualifications-and any change the eight
discreet time periods investigated with regard to other questions-is never
presented in graphical format, although it is produced in tabular formatsort of. 132 However, to discern changes that might relate to the Silicon
Breast Implant cases, we would need comparisons of segmented time
periods, such as 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1989- 1993, 1993-1997, and
following 1997 (parenthetically these are also the time periods reflecting
the greatest changes when other issues were noted). However, these data
were bifurcated into two groups, pre and post 1993, and it is impossible to
parse out the critical information. 133
Figure 7. Frequency with which expert qualifications addressed and
expert found unqualified (case type, substantive area of evidence, and
appellate court held constant).
50
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RAND Figure 6.3. Reproduced with permissionfrom the RAND
Corporation. See RAND STUDY, supra note 9, at 71.

represents disqualification based on qualifications-the exact opposite. See id. In fact, given the
tabular data produced, it would seem to mean that qualifications were not the determining factor
represented in the middle line. See infra Figure 8 (reproducing Table A.6 from RAND STUDY,
supra note 9, at 72).
132 See infra Figure 8 (tabulating qualifications of experts in two groups, 1980-93 and 199399).

133

See id.
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Figure 8. Characteristics of experts (percent of expert-opinion pairs
identified in 399 opinions).
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RAND Table A.6. Reproduced with permissionfrom the RAND
Corporation. See RAND STUDY, supra note 9, at 72.
In sum, the irregularities, lack of consistency or transparency, and
confusing use of terminology in the RAND report is most apparent when
considering the change in expert credentials-but as to why the sudden
shift in the way the data is presented or calibrated, no scientific explanation
based on valid and reliable evidence or controlled studies is given, and we
are left to our own devices to wonder why. 134
As to why there was a tapering off of admissible evidence based on
reliability and relevancy following 1997, we simply do not know for
sure. 135 All we can tell is that generally speaking, after 1997, at least in
toxic torts and products liability cases, the percentage of scientific evidence
ruled admissible under Frye is roughly the same under Daubert as it was
under Frye before 1989.136 And even though the two cases enunciated

134 See discussion supra Parts I.C., II.A.-C. (analyzing flaws in RAND data). In fact, the
recent publication of Fisher's book in 2015 highlights the importance of this omission. See
FISHER, supra note 109, at 132, 150, 191-92, 194. While the delay in having Fisher's
comprehensive and insightful characterization and chronology of events incident to the Silicone
Breast Implant Litigation is unfortunate, it appears that in evaluating the impact of scientific
evidence, delay in reporting may not be unusual, as is illustrated by Jeanne Guillemin's
exquisitely researched investigation on the Anthrax "attacks" of 2001, published ten years later.
See generally JEANNE GUILLEMIN, AMERICAN ANTHRAX:
FEAR, CRIME, AND THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE NATION'S DEADLIEST BIO TERROR ATTACK 1 (2011) (revisiting

America's anthrax biohazard scare post-9/11).
135 See supra Figures 1-7. Whether this could be a reflection of the politics of the federal
judges appointed by a Republican Administration is an open question.
136 See id. (illustrating similar outcomes in admissibility over long term).
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vastly different paradigms for judicial decision making, the differences had
no effect on outcome. 17 The obvious question is-how could that be?
F. The Flaws of Frye
The predicate for both cases according to the opinions turns on
13
how to handle "novel" scientific evidence."
Certainly, the Frye case put
an issue before the judges that had never been raised before, and one that
still vexes courts: To what extent are physiological changes representative
of a person's state of mind, emotional, or psychological state-i.e., is there
any physiological method to measure when a person is lying? 139
The scientific validity of lie detector tests is still questioned and
questionable, and, as stated earlier, simple reliance on pre-existing tests of
evidentiary propriety would have sufficiently validated the court's
ruling. 140 Nevertheless, the appellate court felt compelled to create a new
paradigm for admissibility of scientific evidence: The general consensus

test. 141
To support their conclusion, the court held:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the
line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is
difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while the courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction

137

See Vickers, supra note 8, at 140 ("If Cheng & Yoon are correct, it would seem that

judges in all jurisdictions have adopted this role and that the Daubert decision is largely irrelevant
in explaining what is happening in the courtroom.").
138 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (discussing novel systolic blood
pressure lie detecting machine); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 560 U.S. 579 (1993)
(concerning novel epidemiological evidence to demonstrate birth defects).
139 See generally Frye, 293 F. at 1014 ("We think the systolic blood pressure deception test
has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony.").
140 See discussion supra Part II. and infra Part III.E. (discussing practice of previous courts
to assess scientific validity). To even begin to establish its validity would require multiple testsnone of which had not been done at the time when the test results were attempted to be admitted.
See generally Walczyk, supra note 41 (reviewing theories and techniques of polygraph-based
approaches to lie detection). Even today, adequate evidence of validity and reliability of liedetector tests is wanting. See id. Cultural or personality differences can affect interpretation,
e.g., pathological liars can recreate a new "truth" and believe in it to the extent that to them it
becomes "real" and undifferentiable from a "lie." See id. New devices will likely face similar
problems. See id.
141 See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
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is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general 14acceptance
in the particular field in which it
2
belongs.

The Frye court's categorization of the issue as vetting "novel" science (i.e.,
when has the evidence crossed over from being "experimental" to
"demonstrable"), is, at least, accurate and honest. 14' But the then-standard
mechanisms of evidentiary admissibility (relevance, materiality and
competency) would have worked quite well-as it did for the trial court
judge-and garnered the same result, rendering the District Court's
dicta
144
superfluous, troublesome, and until now, incomprehensible.
Two recent (and exquisitely researched) articles, one in the Yale
Law Journal,145 and a slightly earlier piece in the Journalof the American
Academy of Psychiatry and Law, 146 revealed a slew of hitherto unknown
background facts that probably influenced the appellate court to look for as
much "cover" as possible in rendering their verdict. 147 Thus, rather than
relying on their own judgment, the District Court of Appeals "blamed" the
"consensus in the scientific community," for their refusal to admit
testimony based on a "novel" scientific1 48device-saddling us, at least until
Daubert -with this bright line rubric.
While the Frye holding is well-known, the facts have remained
obscure. Indeed, we do not even know exactly what triggered the appellate
court' s gratuitous and unnecessary holding, notwithstanding some stellar
sleuth work in uncovering the doings and goings-on of the trial court.
These, however, do shed some light on the situation:

142
143
144

Id.
See id.
See generally Lepore, supra note 45,

at 1135

(illustrating trial court Judge's

understanding of scientific credibility); Kenneth J. Weiss et al., Frye's Backstory: A Tale of
Murder, a Retracted Confession, and Scientific Hubris, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 226, 22633 (2014) (discussing trial court's evaluation of expert).
145 See Lepore, supra note 45, at 1139 n.263 (discussing claim by expert witness regarding
validity of systolic blood pressure in determining deception).
146 See Weiss, supra note 144, at 226-33 (discussing facts about defendant and psychologist
in Frye).
147 See Lepore, supra note 45, at 1097 (reconstructing psychologist's role in Frye); Weiss,
supra note 144, at 226-33 (discussing facts behind the Frye case); see also J. E. Starr, "A StillLife Watercolor": Frye v. Unites States, 27 J. FORENSIC SCI. 684, 684-94 (1982) (recounting
facts of Frye litigation); Jim Fisher, The Polygraph and the Frye Case, JIM FISHER BLOG (Jan. 7,
2008), http://jimfisher.edinboro.edu/forensics/frye.html (detailing correspondence between expert
witness and police officer involved in Frye case). The author notes the letter exists in the
Bancroft Library at the University of California, Berkeley. See Fisher, supra, at n.6.
148 See Frye, 293 F. at 1014 ("Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized ... the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.").
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The Frye case concerned the murder of Robert Wade Brown, a
well-to-do black doctor and president of the National Life Insurance
Company. 149 Dr. Brown was shot dead at point blank range in the front
hall of his Washington house before an eye-witness. 150 The murder was
both a mystery and a racial incident, carefully and relentlessly covered by
the press.151 A year after Dr. Brown's death, James Alphonso Frye was
charged with killing Brown and indicted for first-degree murder. 152 All
that would save him from certain conviction (and the death penalty) was a
compelling alibi-which, with the help of his lawyers, he managed to
concoct. 153 Now, all that remained was to convince the jury of his
credibility.
Mr. Frye's lawyers happened to be students of one Dr. William
Marston, a lawyer-turned-psychologist, who "claims to have perfected a
device or means of measuring and recording the blood pressure to such an
extent that with the aid of this device he can detect deception." 154 After
administering the primitive lie detector test to Frye in prison, and on the
basis of the results of his new-and barely tested-device, Dr. Marston
concluded that James Frye was telling the truth-that155he did not kill Dr.
Brown, and he was prepared to testify to that effect.
The trial judge, Walter I. McCoy, was hardly science-phobic. 156 A
graduate of Harvard College and Law School, he parsed straight through to
the infirmities of Dr. Marston' s invention, was not intimidated byMarston' s
glittering credentials or kowtowed by Marston's association with Dean
Wigmore, of evidentiary fame, who had consulted with Marston on his
"novel" discovery."1 5 7 In fact, McCoy had no trouble excluding the
1 58
evidence-without the need for the "Frye" test.
149 See Weiss, supra note 144, at 226.
150 See id.
151

See id.

152

See idat227.

153 See id.

154 Lepore, supra note 45, at 1138.
155 Id.at 1123-27 (recounting actual events leading to Marston taking stand at Frye's trial).
156 See

Walter Irving McCoy, BIOGRAPHICAL

DIRECTORY

OF THE

U.S. CONGRESS,

http:/Ibioguide.congress.gov/scriptsbiodisplay.pl?index=M000376. Prior to Law School, McCoy
attended Phillips Exeter Academy and Princeton. Id. In addition to a law degree from Harvard,
Justice McCoy also earned a Master's degree. Id.
157 See Lepore, supra note 45, at 1100-22 (chronicling life of Marston). The proffered
expert, Dr. William Marston, was much bally-ho'ed by the forensic- science elite, as operating
"the only psycho-legal research laboratory in the United States." Id. at 1137. According to the
American University Courier, in October 1922, "William Moulton Marston, psychologist and
lawyer, has been appointed to the chair of Psychology at the American University . . . and
arrangements have been made to open ... what will probably be the only psycho-legal research
laboratory in the United States .
I..."
Id. at 1137 n.250. According to Marston, Wigmore made a
practical suggestion on improving the deception test in court: To amplify the blood pressure
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As Judge McCoy plunged right in to evaluate the expert and the
proffered evidence, he was not impressed:
McCoy had reviewed at least one study with care, the
study Marston had published in Wigmore's Journal of
CriminalLaw and Criminology,in which Marston reported

the results of deception tests he'd conducted on twenty
criminal defendants and, as McCoy saw at a glance, the
investigation was wildly unscientific: the cases were
handpicked; there was no control group; and the blood
pressure 9 test itself might have affected subsequent
15
events.
In his repartee with attorney Mattingly, who was representing Frye, Judge
McCoy was wittingly eloquent in demonstrating his complete
understanding of the nature of science, the scientific method and the
competing evidentiary issues at hand:
THE COURT. .

.

. As far as that test is concerned, Dr.

Marston will admit that it was not scientific as far as his
instrument was concerned, because, as he understands, as a
scientist, he has to exclude everything except the constants
before he can make a deduction. If there are a lot of
variables, all he can say is that on the whole this is
probably so. When it is developed to the perfection of the
telephone and the telegraph and wireless and a few other
things we will consider it. I shall be dead by that time,
probably, and it will bother some other judge, not me.160
At this point there is colloquy about admitting novel science, to which the
judge admits that merely because something is new is not grounds for
exclusion (presaging Daubert,in a sense):
Mr. MATTINGLY. That is always the way with anything
new.
reading so the jurors could see the fluctuations as they were happening. See Weiss, supra note
144, at 230. Although it could be done, Marston declined: "I believed that the jury should not be
permitted to form their own opinions of a witness's blood pressure record. Interpretation of the
record should be made only by experts, psychologists with legal training and experience in lie
detecting." Id.
158 See Weiss, supra note 144, at 226-33.
159 Lepore, supra note45, at 1135.
160 Id. at 1132 (quoting Transcript of Record at 14, Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923) (on file with National Archives, RG 276, Briefs 3986, Box 380)).
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The COURT. I suppose it depends upon whether you are
before a conservative judge or a young one who is willing
to take chances. I have gotten too old and too much inured
to certain general principles in regard to the trial of cases to
depart from them rashly. Of course anything may happen.
It may be that cases will be tried in the absence of
defendants with a mere record of whether he is telling the
truth about certain things brought in by an expert; I do not
know, but so far the jury looks at the witnesses, hears what
they have to say, compares their statements with other
statements, and so forth, and then does what human beings
out of Court do when they determine whether or not a man
is telling the truth. 161
Mattingly then goes on to discuss some instances where new science was
admitted:
The COURT. Well, I will give you this distinction. Fifty
years ago if anybody had said that the human voice spoken
in Washington could be heard in Chicago he would have
been thought crazy. Since that time we all know that such
is the fact, and we do not bring experimental matters into
court, but when it is established that scientific development
has reached such a point as to become a matter of common
knowledge as to its results we allow the results to be
162
shown in court.
Judge McCoy raises several bases for excluding Marston's
testimony-none based on general acceptance of the scientific
community. 16' He talks about controlled studies; he cites the ceterisparibus
rule of eliminating all other causes but the one under consideration; he talks
about regard for "general principles in regard to trial of cases"; he
distinguishes between science still in the experimental stages, and science
which "has become a matter of common knowledge" (i.e., generally
accepted in the lay community). 164 Here, he is alluding to the telephone and
the fact that the common man is well-acquainted with the device and its

161
162
163

Id. at 1134 (quoting Transcript of Record, supra note 160).
Id. at 1129 (quoting Transcript of Record, supra note 160).
See id. at 1127-36 (quoting exchange between Judge McCoy and attorney Mattingly

challenging Marston's testimony).
164 Id. at 1129 (quoting Transcript of Record, supra note 160); Weiss, supra note 144, at 228
(discussing McCoy's reasons for excluding Marston's testimony).
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reliability-if not the mechanism of how it works. 165 But most important,
Judge McCoy recognizes a secondary issue-whether the device is
encroaching on the province of the jury. 166 And he clearly notes his refusal
to take from the jury their role of discerning credibility of witnesses. 167
The issue, then, McCoy properly notes, is not only one of whether
Marston's contraption was reliable-but whether it served a useful purpose
which was not equally well (or perhaps better)
performed by the jury-the
168
ascertainment of credibility of a witness.
Following the opinion, the jury convicted Frye, albeit of the lesser
charge of second degree murder, sparing him the death sentence. 169 Some
commentators assert that the entire colloquy regarding admissibility of
testimony designed to show Frye's innocence was heard in the jury's
presence and affected their verdict. 170

1
Chief Justice Walter I McCoy 71

165
166
167
168
169

See Lepore, supra note 45, at 1132 (quoting Transcript of Record, supra note 161).
See id. at 1133-34 (reconfirming jury's role in court proceedings).
See id. at 1133.
See id. (explaining rationale for refusing admission of evidence).
See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (restating trial court

conviction and basis for appeal); see also Weiss, supra note 144, at 227 (chronicling events after
Frye's arrest and conviction).
170 See Weiss, supra note 144, at 227-28 (explaining influence lie detector test has on jury).
171 Chief Justice Walter I. McCoy, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS DIV.,
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The ruling made headlines. 1 72 Newspaper headlines focused on the
"quick and ignominious death" of the deception apparatus: "Court Rules
Out Lie-Finding Device," "Invention Met Its Death on First Trial," and
"Quick Death to 'Sphygmomanometer,"' for example. 1 73 "Immediately
after the trial, however, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed
to rule on the admissibility of the sphygmomanometer. It appears that the
fate of the lie detector sold more newspapers than stories of the underlying
crime." 174
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled on James Frye's
appeal in 1923.175 "In what some consider a maddeningly terse two-page
opinion," Associate Justice Van Orsdel first articulates the principles
behind using systolic blood pressure to monitor truth-telling, before
shackling us with the "general consensus in the scientific community
test." 1 76 What is astounding is that while acknowledging the issue of
limiting expert testimony to matters outside the ken of the jury, Van Orsdel
did not seize on that to affirm Judge McCoy's ruling; instead, casting the
general consensus hex.1 77 The question remains why.
One possibility is the role of Wigmore. 178 The interest of Wigmore
in the case is well documented, as was Wigmore's interest in psychology
and its use in the courtroom. 1 79 For Wigmore, "[n]o science [sic] was more
important to the law of evidence, than psychology, and no aspect of
psychological research was more important to judicial proof than the study
of testimony." 8 0 Wigmore was ready to throw precedent to the winds and
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/hec.20992.
172 See Weiss, supra note 144, at 228 (describing newspapers' sensational reaction to court's
treatment of deception detector).
173 See id. at n.9-13 (listing newspaper headlines).
174

See id. at 228.

175

Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (considering single issue of

whether exclusion of expert testimony regarding "novel" deception test was proper).
176 See Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14; Weiss, supra note 144, at 228 (observing brevity of
opinion).
177 See Frye, 293 F. at 1014; Lepore, supra note 45, at 1014. "When the question involved
does not lie within the range of common experience or common knowledge, but requires special
experience or special knowledge, then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular science,
art, or trade to which the question relates are admissible in evidence." Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
Clearly, the issue of witness credibility is within the realm and ken of a jury, and in fact, it is
within their exclusive purview, even if the means by which they do their job is not "scientific."
See, e.g., SEYMOUR DWIGHT THOMPSON, 3 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRIALS IN ACTIONS
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 2135 (2d ed. 1912) ("The jury are the exclusive judges of the credibility of
the witnesses ....
").
178 See Lepore, supra note 45, at 1117 (discussing influence of Wigmore).
179

See id.

180

See id. In Principles of Judicial Proof, Wigmore's discussion of testimonial evidence

runs more than four hundred pages. See

JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL
PROOF: AS GIVEN BY LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY, AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE, AND ILLUSTRATED IN
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abandon conventional "scientific" methods in order to allow new tests to be
admitted.181 And Wigmore's scathing ability to lance into an adversary
was not to be taken lightly, especially when it involved psychological
testing and evidence. 18 2 It is known that Marston approached Wigmore to
judge his findings, and that Wigmore consented, but it is not known
precisely the role Wigmore played in the case183or whether his opinions held
any sway with the judge or appellate judges.
Probably more significant is the amount of newspaper coverage the
ruling of Judge McCoy garnered-for not only was this a case involving
scientific evidence, but one involving race relations. 184 Van Orsdel surely
suspected his opinion would receive similar-if not greater coverage-and
scrutiny.
The Frye court's search for "cover" under these circumstances is
understandable, if regrettable, for in creating the "general consensus"
paradigm, the District Court exposed their naivetd about the manner of
doing science. They also cursed us with an unfortunate legacy; scientists
are just as loathe to abandon the status quo as, say, academics. As the
physicist Max Planck stated: "A new scientific truth does not triumph by
convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because
its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar

JUDICIAL TRIALS, 312-743, 585-91 (1913). Wigmore's remarks, reprinted from his 1909 review

of On the Witness Stand, are noteworthy. See Lepore, supra note 45, at 1105.
181 See Lepore, supra note 45, at 1124-25. Interestingly, it has been noted that "If such tests
are ever adopted, it is probable that the jury system will have to be abandoned unless education
will have advanced so far that twelve men picked at random will adequately absorb blood
pressures, time reactions, and intelligence quotients, and combine the mass into a just verdict. In
other words, the jury might also be subjected to an intelligence test." Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The
Progressof the Law, 1919-1921 Evidence, 35 HARV. L. REv. 302, 309 (1922).
182 See John H. Wigmore, ProfessorMiinsterbergand the Psychology of Testimony, 3 ILL. L.
REV. 399, 400-34 (1909) (reporting on early impact of experimental psychology on American
judiciary). Wigmore's attack on Felix Frankfurter regarding his opinion in the Sacco and
Vanzetti case is memorialized in a letter from Justice Brandeis to Frankfurter, dated April 27,
1927:
Your telegram reached me at Court. Your letter with the Wigmore blast & your
answer did not come to me until late this afternoon. I talked personally to Holmes J.,
& he is fully prepared for any rabid attack by Wigmore on any one, through W's
attacks on him. W's attack on the Senate in the April Illinois Law Review & other
performances are evidence of an unbalanced mind.
Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (April 27, 1927), in 5 LETTERS OF Louis D.
BRANDEIS, 282-83 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1978).
183 See Lepore, supra note 45, at 1124-25 (chronicling Marston's efforts and correspondence
with Wigmore).
184 See id. at 1141 (discussing historical context of Frye).
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with it." 185 "New scientific ideas never spring from a communal body,
however organized, but rather from the head of an individually inspired
researcher who struggles with his problems in lonely thought and unites all
his thought186on one single point which is his whole world for the
moment."
Planck's sentiment has been paraphrased as "science advances, one
funeral at a time," a viewpoint ratified by Thomas Kuhn. 187 In fact, the
halls of science are littered with the bodies and even suicides of scientists
who took their own lives 1 88 or died, poor and unrecognized, because their
critical discoveries were ignored, trashed, or ridiculed by "the general
consensus of the scientific community."1 89 In documenting the history of
modern astrophysics and black holes, Marcia Bartusiak notes case after
case of scientists who produced scientific work which is now generally
accepted, but which was ridiculed, attacked or marginalized when first
presented.1 90 Bartusiak neatly sums up her thesis as follows: "'All truth
passes through three stages: First, it is ridiculed; second, it is violently
185 MAX PLANCK, SCIENTIFIC AUTOBIOGRAPHY

& OTHER PAPERS 33-34 (Frank Gaynor

trans., Philosophical Library 1949).
186 Max Planck, Address on the 25th Anniversary of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Gesellschaft (Jan.
1936).
187

KUHN, supra note 11, at 5, 7, 159-72 (discussing scientific advancement in human

history).
188 See, e.g., Peter Moore, Op-Ed., The Great Victorian Weather Wars, N.Y. TIES, Aug. 7,
2015, at SR7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/O8/O9/opinion/sunday/the-greatvictorian-climate-debate.html? r=0 (documenting case of meteorologist Robert Fitzroy, who
made great strides and took his life in 1865); Lawrence P. Lessing, Edwin H. Armstrong:
American Inventor, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.comlbiography/EdwinH-Armstrong (discussing life and suicide of Edwin Armstrong, discoverer of FM radio) (last
visited Dec. 3, 2015).
189 See RUTH F. HUME, GREAT MEN OF MEDICINE 98-202 (1960). Hume discusses the
experiences of luminaries such as Edward Jenner, discoverer of the smallpox vaccine, Rene
Laennec, discoverer of the stethoscope, and Joseph Lister, who introduced antiseptic surgery,
who fall into this category. See id. Galileo suffered similarly, as did Copernicus. See MARIO
BIAGIOLI, GALILEO, COURTIER: THE PRACTICE OF SCIENCE IN THE CULTURE OF ABSOLUTISM

77, 90, 99 (1994) (highlighting Galileo's struggles); Letter from Cardinal Bellarmine to Foscarini
(Apr.
12,
1615),
available
at
http://elearning.gilman.edu/pluginfile.php/58826/mod resource/content/1/Bellarmine%20Attack
%20on%20the%20Copernican%20Theory.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2015). For a description of
the chauvinistic attitudes of physicists aiming to preserve the status quo (i.e., "the general
consensus"), see generally LEE SMOLIN, THE TROUBLE WITH PHYSICS 265 ( 2006) (" In our
attempts to make unbiased evaluations of our peers' work, we professors tend almost reflexively
to reward those who agree with us and penalize those who disagree."). Smolin quotes particle
physicist JoAnne Hewett: "I find the arrogance of some string theorists astounding, even by
physicists' standards .... " and notes that the arrogance Dr. Hewitt describes has been prominent
in the community of string theorists for some time. See id. at 268-69. Smolin also notes the
impact of other agendas besides science in arriving at and preserving a consensus. See id. at 345.
190 See MARCIA BARTUSIAK, BLACK HOLE: How AN IDEA ABANDONED BY NEWTONIANS,
HATED BY EINSTEIN, AND GAMBLED ON BY HAWKING BECAME LOVED ix-x (2015).
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opposed; and third, it is accepted as being self-evident.' The concept of the
black hole fully experienced each and every phase."1 91 An example is the
grief given to Stephen Hawking when he first announced results of
mathematical experiments that "provided the missing pieces of black hole
thermodynamics":
Needless to say, this idea [at first] did not enthrall his
fellow physicists. Relativist Werner Israel says that it
"aroused strong opposition almost as soon as it was in
print.

.

.

.

Skepticism was prolonged and virtually

unanimous." When Hawking first announced his result...
it was greeted with total disbelief. At the end of the talk
the chairman .. .claimed it was all nonsense.
"Sorry,
' 192

Stephen," he said, "but this is absolute rubbish."
193

Subsequently, Hawking was proven right.
In sum, the "general acceptance" test is, scientifically speaking, a
futile means of evaluating whether "novel" science is "scientific" or not.
Plainly speaking, it is just wrong-although it may be the best we have in
some legal circumstances.
Fortunately, the concept of general acceptance in the scientific
community appears to have been eschewed by other judges, at least before
Daubert.1 94 Counter-intuitively, this was not the case afterwards: "The
RAND Study found that before Daubert, 'general acceptance' was not
commonly used as a factor for admissibility... The surprising finding,

191
192
193

ILd.
(quoting nineteenth-century philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer).
Id. at 169.
See id. Similar experiences happened to Peter Higgs (of the Higg's boson) as well:
The idea was initially met with suspicion and even ridicule in certain circles. His
first paper was rejected by a journal, and some peers accused him and some
colleagues of failing to grasp the basic principles of physics .... [According to
Higgs,] "[n]obody else took what I was doing seriously, so nobody would want to
work with me."... Upon publication of his work on the particle in 1964, he and
his colleagues were widely dismissed as young pretenders, with some even
suggesting they should abandon their research or risk.

Kunal Dutta, Working on the 'God Particle' Saved My Life, Says Peter Higgs, INDEP. (Feb. 21,
2014); see also National Post, From Ridicule to Rave: Higgs & His Boson, CANADA.COM (July 5,
2012), http://www.canada.com/story.html?id=7e84471e-082b-4459-b510-d905f31fe01c ("When
Peter Higgs first proposed that an invisible field strewn across space gave mass to the building
blocks of the universe, the theory was ridiculed by some of the most respected minds of the
time.").
194 See Vickers, supra note 8, at 128 (explaining that before Daubert, "general acceptance"
was not commonly used).
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however, was that after Daubert,a lack of general acceptance
was as much
' 195
a barrier to admission as before, and possibly a greater one."
This bizarre finding is troublesome and a ready explanation is
unavailable. However, I would venture that perhaps when faced with
proffers of "novel" science which is intuitively "unscientific," although
they cannot articulate why in technical terms, modern judges, like those in
Frye, resort to the comfort of resting on the laurels of the established
scientific community on which to hang their judicial decisions.
G. The Deficits and Damage Wrought by Daubert
This does not, however, explain the rejection of Frye's "general
consensus" test by the Daubertjudges (at a time when the test was
apparently not even in judicial vogue).
In Daubert,the dilemma was predicated on a clash between
epidemiological studies and biological
data regarding the pre-natal effects
96
of the anti-nausea drug Bendectin. 1
After reviewing the evidence, the Daubert court first held that:
Given the vast body of epidemiological data concerning
Bendectin, the court held, expert opinion which is not
based on epidemiological evidence is not admissible to
establish causation. Thus, the animal cell studies, live
animal studies, and chemical structure analyses on which
petitioners had relied could not raise by themselves a
reasonably disputable jury issue regarding causation.
Petitioners' epidemiological analyses, based as they were
on recalculations of data in previously published studies
that had found no causal link between the drug and birth
defects, were ruled to be inadmissible because
they had not
19
been published or subjected to peer review. 7

195 Id. (summarizing RAND Study findings). When it is used, however, "general acceptance
was usually sufficient for admissibility .... Using regression analysis, the [RAND] authors found
that general acceptance pre-Daubert was not a good indicator of whether evidence would be
found reliable or not, but general acceptance post-Daubert was, in fact, a good indicator of
reliability. According to the authors of the study, there is '[n]o indication it became easier for
novel evidence to be admitted."' Id.
196 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582-584 (1993) (discussing
alleged birth defects caused by prenatal ingestion of Bendectin).
197 Id. at 583-84 (citing District Court decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F.
Supp. 570, 575 (S.D. Cal. 1989)).
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But not content to limit themselves to the evidence before them, the
Daubert court then set out a new paradigm on which to evaluate all
scientific evidence, 198 produced additional constructs for judicial
consideration and overruled the Frye test.1 99 Ostensibly, the basis for this
new approach was predicated on the quagmire of novel concepts and
complicated scientific evidence with which they were faced. The scientific
evidence involved, however, was anything but novel (or to use the Frye
court's terminology, "experimental" as opposed to "demonstrable"). Nor
was it the first time the Supreme Court had confronted such evidence-the
first introduction of epidemiological evidence was made more than a
century earlier! 20 0 Thus, it cannot in any way be said that the evidence
confronting the court was "novel. 2 1
Nevertheless, spitting out what clearly was obiter dicta,20 2 the
Daubert court introduced a series of new constructs to substitute for the
now debunked "general consensus" test.20 3 Indicating that the Frye test
See id. at 589-90 (articulating new standard by which courts will judge scientific

198

evidence).
The subject of an expert's testimony must be "scientific . . .knowledge." The
adjective "scientific" implies grounding in the methods and procedures of science.
Similarly, the word "knowledge" connotes more than subjective belief or
unsupported speculation. The term "applies to any body of known facts or to any
body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds."
[quoting Webster's Dictionary] . . . But, in order to qualify as "scientific
knowledge," an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method.
Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation-i.e., "good
grounds," based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert's
testimony pertain to "scientific knowledge" establishes a standard of evidentiary
reliability.
Id.
199

See Vickers, supra note 8, at 135. It must be reiterated that whether a case is heard under

Frye or Daubert, the outcome would likely be the same. See id. This is confirmed by Cheng and
Yoon's study, showing "that a state's choice of evidentiary standards does not have a statistically
significant effect on removal rates in that state .
lo.
d.
t"(citing Cheng & Yoon, supra note 73, at
503). From this data, Cheng and Yoon "inferred that a state's adoption of Frye or Dauben
makes no difference in practice." Id.
200 United States v. Forty Barrels & Twenty Kegs of Coca-Cola, 241 U.S. 265, 271 (1916)
(considering whether caffeine added to food was deleterious ingredient).
201 See id. Perhaps what the Supreme Court was referring to was not the novelty of the
method-but the interpretation of the results-a scientifically inappropriate use of the concept of
"novel science."
202 See Originalism v. Minimalism, 36 CATO POL'Y REP. 9, 9 (2014) ("Sunstein proposes
that judges should generally avoid broad rules and abstract theories and attempt to focus their
attention only on what is necessary to resolve particular disputes.").
203 See Vickers, supra note 8, at 144. "While [Daubert] helped revolutionize how judges
across the country in all jurisdictions perceive scientific evidence and their role in assessing it, it
also provided a standard with little usable content." Id.
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was no longer valid, 204 although not totally eviscerating the "general
consensus test," the Daubertcourt enunciated that evidence must be
grounded in science-which they defined as evidence which is (a)
"falsifiable", 20 5 (b) uses the scientific method, (c) considers error rates, and
(d) possibly peer review.20 6
H. The Ghost of Frye: Why Isn't DaubertBeing Followed?
In evaluating the extent to which these (non-exclusive and nonbinding) parameters enumerated in Daubert were followed, it appears that
mostly they were not,20 and that judges' "bench philosophy of science"
seemed to reflect the rhetoric, rather than the substance, of Daubert.201 It
therefore worth remembering in this context that not all states have
incorporated Daubert; some still rely on Frye, perhaps for the reason that
while judges are sympathetic with the philosophy of Daubert, they are
more comfortable understanding its precepts of Frye.2 °9

204 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993)

("[S]ince its

formulation in the Frye case, the 'general acceptance' test has been the dominant standard for
determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence at trial. . . . Just when a scientific
principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is
difficult to define.") (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923)).
205 See Cecil, supra note 28, at 575. Cecil commented that "Few [state] judges, for example,
were able to define the concept of 'falsifiability,' which was one of the factors mentioned in
Daubert." Id. Gatowski demonstrated that "only 5% of the respondents demonstrating a clear
understanding of 'falsifiability,' and only 4% demonstrating a clear understanding of error rate.
Although there was little consensus about the relative importance of the guidelines, judges
attributed more weight to general acceptance as an admissibility criterion." Gatowski, supra note
14, at 444; see also Veronica B. Dahir et al., Judicial Application of Daubert to Psychological
Syndrome and Profile Evidence: A Research Note, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 62, 64 (2005)
(discussing guidelines set out in opinion and origins of "falsifiability").
206 See Daubert,509 U.S. at 593-94; see also Gatowski, supra note 14, at 444-48 (discussing
study results regarding judges' opinions of falsifiability, error rate, peer review, and general
acceptance). Whether "peer review" is really distinct from general consensus is disputable.
Further, the peer review process has been criticized as being motivated by the scientific
establishment who staffs the journals and reviews the papers to keep the status quo firmly in place
and leads to an indefensible practice of rejecting new or novel scientific discoveries. See
generally 287 JAMA 2739-2898 (June 5, 2002) (focusing on peer review quality). Nevertheless,
Sophia Gatowski's study found that 71% of judges understood the utility of the peer review
process, so perhaps it is useable merely because Judges understand it. See Gatowski, supra note
14, at 447.
207 See Vickers, supra note 8, at 143 (suggesting judges may not have understanding of
reliability factors or how to apply them); see also RAND Study, supra note 9, at 40 (finding over
time, judges used non-Daubertreliability factors more often).
208 See Gatowski, supra note 14, at 453 (implying judges may never understand practical
value of Daubert unless provided sufficient scientific education).
209 See Lepore, supra note 45, at 1140; sources cited supra note 46 (listing eight states where
Frye is still good law). "Fifteen states, along with the District of Columbia, continue to rely on
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Because The RAND study and Gatowksi's work empirically
demonstrate that post-Daubert,judges did not use the Daubert tests to
make their decisions,210 several questions arise:
1. If judges did not use the Daubert tests post-Daubert,why not?
2. What accounted for the shift in admissibility in the postDaubert years?

3. On what basis did judges make their decisions up until 1997,
and
4. On what basis are courts making their decisions now?
The importance of these questions bears on two additional issues: (1) if we
don't know on what basis judges determine admissibility, appellate review
becomes problematic; (2) if the reason judges are not following Daubertis
want of understanding, then it behooves us to set out a training program
that is accessible and which they will be able to follow-if indeed this is
possible, a question Vickers raises.2
III. HOW DID WE GET HERE AND HOW DO WE GET OUT?
Before proceeding to simplify and legitimize a workable system to
enable gatekeepers to weed out noxious "pseudo-pscientific" [sic]
interlopers and voodoo science, it is worthwhile to examine how the
current situation came about. Certainly once Frye was no longer valid, the
court was hard pressed to come up with an alternative:
When agreement about what constitutes scientific
knowledge can range so widely that even long-held ideas
are challenged, it is not easy to come up with a workable
alternative to the Frye test, which requires the judge to be
an arbiter of the views of practicing scientists. Trying to
decide which expert is reasoning properly seems a rather
difficult task for a court, when even scientists often
the Frye standard. . . .Frye is not only alive, but it is the plurality rule in state courts, which are
the venue for the vast majority of litigation." Lepore, supra note 45, at 110 (quoting David E.
Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present and Future of the General Acceptance Test, 41
Jurimetrics 385 (2001)); Kaufman, supra note 45, at 1-3 (2006) (listing states adopting Daubert).
This also manifests a continuing trend since the decision was issued in 1993 and the Federal
Rules were amended in 2000. See Lepore, supra note 45, at 1140.
210 See Gatowski, supra note 14, at 453; RAND Study, supra note 9, at 40.
211 See Vickers, supra note 8, at 110 ("Thus, criticisms aimed at the text itself, specifically at
the criteria for reliability ... would seem to miss the mark. The better questions to ask are why
the decision failed to provide criteria that judges actually find useful in drawing these distinctions
and what criteria judges are, in fact, using to distinguish between admissible and inadmissible
evidence .... It also begs the serious question of why the decision did not create a more useful
doctrinal test.").
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disagree on how to do it. 212
Without any grounding in science themselves, the Daubertmajority turned
to the world of philosophy, perhaps a more comfortable intellectual venue,
to find an anchor. 213 Hence Daubert derives its definition of "science"
(upon which the holding hinges) from Karl Popper, the psychologist turned
philosopher who relentlessly argued that "science" considers matters which
are "falsifiable" and subjects hypotheses to the test of "falsification., 214 In
other words, Popper claims that scientists proffer hypotheses and then go
about trying to disprove them. 215 Luckily for the Daubert court, this view
is supported by a narrow cadre of scientists, physicists mainly, most of
whom were engaged in the world of quantum theory and cosmology. 216 It
is not surprising that the American Association for the Advancement of
Science (AAAS) submitted an amicus brief supporting the Popperian view
(and cited by the court), as the president at the time the brief was written
was an eminent Nobel Prize winning theoretical physicist. 21
While Popper's definition is, indeed, embraced by quantum
physicists 218 (a subject totally irrelevant to the courtroom), it has been
rejected 21 9 by the formulators and codifiers of the scientific method

212

Jan Beyea & Daniel Berger, Scientific MisconceptionsAmong Daubert Gatekeepers: The

Need for Reform of Expert Review Procedures,DUKE L.J. 327, 355 (2001).
213 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (citing Karl Popper's
definition of "falsifiability").
214 See KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE 37 (1989) [hereinafter POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS]; KARL POPPER,
THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 16, 315 (2002).
215 See POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS, supra note 214, at 37 ("[T]he criterion of
the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability").
216 See Billauer, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence under Daubert, supra note 16. The
author argues Popper's views are irrelevant to the science of courtroom, i.e., biology, physiology
and medicine, chemistry and simple (Newtonian) physics, which are totally different from
modern physics in approach and practice. See id.; see also GEORGE GORE, THE ART OF
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY: OR, THE GENERAL CONDITIONS AND METHODS OF RESEARCH IN
PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY 14 (1878) (stating biology is more complicated than either physics or
chemistry).
217 See Lepore, supra note 45, at 1146. In fact, one commentator suggested that the amicus
brief has become an evidentiary backdoor, a way for "expert testimony" to be introduced into the
record without having to satisfy the Federal Rules of Evidence standards for expertise. Id.
218 The AAAS president at the time was Leon Lederman, the Nobel Laureate physicist who
discovered the 6th quark and is a devout champion of the philosophy of Karl Popper. See
Discussion with Leon Lederman, Director Emeritus, Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory
(Summer 1996). In a conversation regarding the definition and meaning of "cosmology,"
Professor Lederman expressed to me his opinion made without reservation that the definition of
science turns on "falsifiability." Id.
219 The concept was brilliantly mocked in literature of the day.
See SINCLAIR LEWIS,
ARROWSMITH 1 (1924). Arrowsmith tells the story is of a young doctor glorifying the ideal of
pure research, hard data and controlled experiments-with the objective of falsifying results ("the
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research as it applies to medicine and physiology,220 chemistry,
and
Newtonian physicists 222 (i.e., the scientific subjects of interest in the
courtroom). Further, Popper's approach is incompatible with basic
formulations of causation as contemplated in law, a subject I tackle in a
companion paper. 22 ' These facts alone should render Daubertan
inherently invalid method upon which to evaluate proffered scientific
evidence.
Layered upon these problems are a hodge-podge of confusing or
inartfully explained tests, and the co-mingling the distinct scientific
concepts of validity (testing designed to prove or verify the hypothesis in
question) and reliability (results which are capable of being reproduced by
independent investigators, without regard to its veracity in terms of proving
the hypothesis in question). In science, both tests must be satisfied to pass

constraints of scientific rigor. In Daubertthese tests are amalgamated into
a single precept of legal reliability.224
As to why these tests have not been implemented, commentators
and surveys report that judges feel unnerved by the gatekeeper role
destroyers") as Lewis called them, "men [who] had more fun destroying other people's theories
than creating their own." Id.at 42, 117. Ultimately young Arrowsmith gives up his practice,
leaves his wife and walks out on his son to work as a recluse on research of his choosing even
with little likelihood of success "whether it should be the structure of the atom, or a disproof of
the results of Drs. Wickett and Arrowsmith." Id.at p. 427.
220 See CLAUDE BERNARD, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF EXPERIMENTAL MEDICINE
177 (Henry C. Greene trans., Dover Publications (1957) ("Negative facts, no matter how
numerous they may be, can never destroy a single positive fact. That is why pure and simple
negation is not criticism, and this method should be absolutely rejected in science, because
science is never built up by negation."). Claude Bernard's objective was to establish the use of
the scientific method in medicine and proof by experimental verification. See id.
221 See ROGER PENROSE ET AL., THE LARGE, THE SMALL AND THE HUMAN MIND 166
(Malcolm Longair ed., 1999). As Nancy Cartwright says, "[e]ssentially all sciences except
physics are special sciences. That means that their laws hold at best only ceteris paribus. They
hold only so long as nothing from outside the domain of the theory in question interferes." ld.
Kuhn notes that physicists and chemists do not even "see" the same things the same way, even
something as elemental as a molecule. See KUHN, supra note 11, at 50-51.
222 See PLANCK, supra note 185, at 131 (noting difference between classical physics and
"quantum" or modern physics); see also JAMES K. CHANDLER ET AL., QUESTIONS OF EVIDENCE:
PROOF, PRACTICE, AND PERSUASION ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES 492 (1994) (noting that some
philosophers of science believe that "the laws of physics lie."). This approach would clearly be
an anathema to Daubert which insists on vigorous compliance with the scientific method,
presumably meaning by controlled experiment.
223 See Billauer, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence under Daubert, supra note 16
(demonstrating Popper's views are incompatible with joint or multi-causation, substantial
causation, etc.). Popper eschews the idea of causation or determinism. See id.; see also J. L.
HEILBRON, DILEMMAS OF AN UPRIGHT MAN: MAX PLANCK AS SPOKESMAN FOR GERMAN

SCIENCE 66 (1986) ("The assumption of an absolute determinism is the essential foundation of
every scientific inquiry.").
224 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 590, 590 n.9 (1993) (articulating how
scientific reliability in the law will be determined based only upon scientific validity).
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22 5
imposed by Daubert.
The RAND "findings also illuminate concerns that
judges may not be competent to perform the task of distinguishing between
good and bad science.... [But] perhaps the most common complaint about
Daubertis that it forces judges to become amateur scientists, a role they are
not well-prepared for and should not be asked to play., 226 Additional data
suggests that judges had a hard time or were ill-prepared to understand the
Daubert criteria.22 Some investigators found that judges did not utilize the
Daubert tests for want of understanding. 22 The dissent of Chief Justice
Rehnquist 229 stated his concern outright-that judges might have difficulty
comprehending the concept of falsifiability, a sentiment corroborated by
Gatowski's empirical research. 2 0 For whatever reason, "the data would
seem to imply that Dauberthas failed to provide a framework that judges,
at least in recent years, find useful in distinguishing between good and bad
science, or admissible and inadmissible evidence. 2 31
This may well sum up the current state of affairs-judges just do
not have the training or ability to discern the difference between good and
bad science.232 If that is indeed the case, one wonders about the ability of
the Daubertjudges to even conjure the tests in the first place.

225
226
227

See Gatowski, supra note 14, at 433.
Id.
See RAND Study, supra note 9, at 6. Practically speaking, the RAND data suggests that

whether a case is heard under Frye or Daubert, the outcome would likely be the same. See id.;
Vickers, supra note 8, at 194. This conclusion is confirmed by Cheng and Yoon's study that
showed "that a state's choice of evidentiary standards does not have a statistically significant
effect on removal rates in that state," from which Cheng and Yoon inferred that a "state's
adoption of Frye or Daubert makes no difference in practice." Vickers, supra note 8, at 195.
Others, including Andrew Jurs and Scott DeVito, disagree. See Andrew Jurs & Scott DeVito,
The Stricter Standard: An Empirical Assessment of Daubert's Effect on Civil Defendants, 62
Cath. U. L. Rev. 675, 680-681 (2013) (concluding Daubert is stricter standard for expert
admissibility).
228 See Gatowski, supra note 14, at 433.
229 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598-601 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (warning dangers of using
falsifiability as definer of "science"). "I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I
am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on
its "falsifiability," and I suspect some of them will be, too." Id. at 600.
230 See Vickers, supra note 8, at 114 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent);
Gatowski, supra note 14, at 433 (evaluating results from survey of state court judges).
Gatowksi's research indicates that judges had difficulty in understanding these considerations,
though and while it seems that more attention was paid to the evidence, it cannot be said that it
was evaluated based on the Daubert parameters. See Gatowski, supra note 14, at 433. Thus, by
comparison to the Frye test where 82% of judges surveyed demonstrated a clear understanding of
"general acceptance," Gatowski's survey of 400 state court judges demonstrated that "only 4% of
judges demonstrated a clear understanding of falsifiability and of error rates." Id. at 447-49.
231 Vickers, supra note 8, at 142.
232 See Neil Vidmar & Shari S. Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV.
1121, 1172 (2001) (discussing Gatowski survey). Gatowski found 73% of judges had no
experience with epidemiological data. Id. In addition, 96% of judges reported that they had not
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An alternative explanation is possible: It may be that the methods
and approaches of Daubert (and as we have seen in Frye) are just plain
wrong. I posit judges somehow instinctively know this (again, just like
Frye) and hence refuse to adhere to the Daubert tests. Lacking an
alternative, but recognizing vigilance is necessary they turn to the Frye
test-again, as a cover. If this is the case, as some commentators suggest, a
different educational approach than is provided in Daubertor conventional
training programs is necessary. 233
But before leaving Daubert and RAND, it is necessary to ask the
same question we asked of the Frye Appellate Court: What motivated the
Daubertjudgesto create a new paradigm and reject Frye? In other words,
why did they do it-especially if the science involved was by no means
"novel"? And since Daubert encumbers judges with acquiring a much
greater understanding of the science behind the evidence than was asked of
judges under Frye, when judges have little training in scientific methods,
reasoning, and research, a second question must be asked: Was their
decision wise?
That the Frye test is mired in the status quo, with little hope of
integrating new scientific advances into the developing matrix of case law
is clear. Thus, in response to the first question, I suggest that given the
speed with which science is advancing, and the increasing awareness that
the hallowed sanctums of "science" and its established scientists move
slowly in welcoming newcomers, it is not surprising that we need a newer,
more adaptive and adaptable legal paradigm to address innovation,
technical breakthroughs and maverick scientists.
The second question is a bit harder. Certainly, the Daubertcourt
searched for a different paradigm to help them sort out their dilemma. But
the key question is why did the Justices need help at all? After all,
complex science is not new to the courts, as will be seen in the following
section.
A. Can Judges UnderstandScience?

As mentioned earlier, the first epidemiological case was presented
to the Supreme Court in 1916.234 The first brief containing scientific
received instruction about general scientific methods and principles (even though the majority
had received some CLE training). Id.
233 See Vickers, supra note 8, at 137 ("Cheng and Yoon then recommend that attempts at
changing or improving the way courts treat scientific evidence could be more effective if
,advocates for rigorous use of scientific evidence shifted their focus away from tinkering with
doctrinal tests and instead toward "softer" solutions that increase the judiciary's understanding of
scientific concepts and processes."').
234 See United States v. Forty Barrels & Twenty Kegs of Coca-Cola, 241 U.S. 265 (1916)
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evidence, Muller v. Oregon,2 35 was submitted to the Supreme Court in
1908 !236 Nicknamed "the Brandeis Brief, ' 23 the brief was 104 pages, of
which 102 were entirely devoted to scientific evidence. 2 8 The Supreme
Court at the time, including Melville Fuller, David Brewer (who wrote the
opinion),2 39 Joseph McKenna, William Day, William Moody, John Harlan,
Edwin White, and Oliver Wendell Holmes 240 all finished their schooling
during the mid to late 1800s-at a time the germ theory of disease had not
yet gained general acceptance-apparently had no problems understanding
the science.241 It must be noted that while at least some of the Justices
attended top flight colleges (e.g., Harvard and Yale), their courses of study
did not concentrate on the sciences.242
(considering whether caffeine added to food was deleterious ingredient).
235 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
236 See Brief for the State of Oregon, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107), 1908
WL 27605.
237 See id. It was written by Louis Brandeis and his sister-in-law, Josephine, a sociologist
(aided by her sister, Pauline), and concerned the effects on women of unhealthy working
conditions. See Florence Kelley, THE SELECTED LETTERS OF FLORENCE KELLEY, 1869-1931
493-94 (Kathryn K. Sklar & Beverly W. Palmer eds., 2009).
238 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Muller v. Oregon: One Hundred Years Later, 45 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 359, 356 ("A British epidemiological study showed a higher prevalence of disease among
laundry workers than among other women.").
239 The brief was mentioned in the opinion in an unusual and explicitly admiring footnote by
Justice Brewer. See Muller, 208 U.S. at 419 n.t ("In the brief filed by Mr. Louis D. Brandeis for
the defendant in error is a very copious collection of all these matters, an epitome of which is
found in the margin.").
240 The philosophy of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, although he did not write the opinion,
may have a bearing on how judges should interpret science today:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of
the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellowmen, have had a good deal more to do than syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's
development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained
only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). The true basis of the decision was

often an "inarticulate major premise," however. A judge was obliged to choose between
contending legal arguments, each posed in absolute terms, and the true basis of his decision was
sometimes drawn from outside the law, when precedents were lacking or were evenly divided.
241 See Ginsburg, supra note 238, at 364-65 (discussing Court's evaluation of scientific
arguments in case). What would have happened if Frye had been appealed to the Supreme Court
is an interesting question. I propose the Court, which at that time included two of the Justices
who heard the "Brandeis Brief," including Holmes, and also Brandeis himself, would have
ratified the holding-but, not being frightened of either science or Wigmore, they would have
struck down the "general consensus" basis which has been plaguing courts ever since.
242 See Barbara P. Billauer, Aaron Aaronsohn and the Zionist Conversion of Justice Louis
Brandeis, POLICY STUDIES ORG. 1, 7 (2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2414425. The
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Science-phobia in the courts may be the root cause of the problems
generated by both Daubert and Frye. It appears that in the first quarter of
the twentieth century, judges had little problem understanding scienceeven science which might flummox today's judges. 243 The excerpts in the
following section are presented in extensive quotations, as to summarize
them would constitute an injustice to the level of judicial understanding at
the time.
B. Novel Science: The Rip Van Winkle Effect

Somehow, the ability of judges to understand science went into
deep sleep-around the time toxic tort cases began to proliferate. By the
mid-1980s, it appears judges began to fall asleep at the prospect of
scientific evidence being admitted. 244 By 1991, they were in suspended
animation and refused to awaken. 245 But lest anyone think judges are
incapable of learning science, a brief foray into life before Frye is
instructive. It appears that before Frye, judges were quite capable to
master not only current science, but also the intricacies of novel science.
The issue of harmful consequences of chemical additives to food
was first addressed legislatively in the United States in 1906. 246 Less than
a decade later, the first cases presented themselves to American courts, and
the judiciary proved they were up to the mettle of understanding the
scientific minutiae of harm. 24 The 1911 opinion of District Judge Sanford
in United States v. Forty Barrels & Twenty Kegs of Coca-Cola248 is
presented first by way of example. In that case, the court had to consider
whether Coca-Cola, designated a food product, was "adulterated," in that it
contained "an added ingredient, caffeine," which was alleged to be a
concept of scientist-legal scholars was not unknown at the time. See id. Roscoe Pound, who
began teaching at Harvard Law School in 1910 and later became Dean in 1916, had a Ph.D. in
botany and had a wide array of friends who were practical and theoretical agronomists. See N. E.
H. HuLL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 41 (1st ed. 1998). By contrast, Pound never finished law school-he read for
the bar at his father's firm, after completing only one year of law school and not doing very well.
See id. at 8.
243 See discussion infra Part IlI.B. (comparing scientific understanding of judges throughout
twentieth century).
244 See discussion supra Part II.D. (discussing emergence of "junk science" in 1980s).
245 See id. (recounting emergence of silicone breast implant litigation in early 1990s).
246 See Adam Burrows, Palette of Our Palates: A Brief History of Food Coloring and Its
Regulation, 8 COMPREHENSIVE REV. IN FOOD SCI. AND FOOD SAFETY 394, 396 (2009), available
at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.111 1/j. 1541-4337.2009.00089.x/epdf.
247 See sources cited infra note 254 (noting wave of litigation following passage of 1906
Food and Drug Act).
248 191 F. 431 (E.D. Tenn. 1911), aff'd, 215 F. 535 (6th Cir. 1914), rev'd, 241 U.S. 265
(1916).
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"poisonous and deleterious ingredient that may render such food product
injurious to health," and in so doing, was forced to consider the effects of
different doses of a substance allegedly causing harm-a rather
sophisticated concept that troubles even today's judges. 249
As the court in United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co.250
noted:
The trial judge decided that if the added substance was
qualitatively poisonous, although in fact added in such
minute quantity as to be noninjurious to health, it still fell
under the ban of the statute; and the distinction is sought to
be drawn between substances admittedly poisonous when
administered in considerable quantities but which serve
some beneficial purpose when administered in small
amounts, and those substances which it is claimed never
can benefit and which in large doses must injure. This
distinction is refined. To apply it must presuppose that
science has exhausted the entire field of investigation as to
the effect upon the human body of these various
substances; that nothing remains to be learned.251
While certainly a "novel" issue, the court nevertheless proceeded to
unapologetically and fearlessly address the issue-without the need for
intervention or reliance on any opinions outside those presented to the
court, such as general consensus of scientists.252
The passage of the 1906 Food and Drug Act resulted in the
government's vigorous attack on adulteration requiring a fairly
sophisticated level of scientific understanding-both of food processing
and of the results of chemical contamination.25 3 The success of the
254
government in both criminal and civil cases attested to their proficiency.

See id. at 431.
202 F. 615 (8th Cir. 1913).
251 Id. at 619.
252 See id. (analyzing complex issues of "adulteration" and effects).
253 See Wesley E. Forte, The Food and Drug Administration and the Economic Adulteration
249
250

of Foods, 41 IND. L.J. 346, 346-49 (1966) (discussing history of government in response to food
adulteration).
254 See, e.g., Union Dairy Co. v. United States, 250 F. 231 (7th Cir. 1918) (discussing milk
diluted by water); Frank v. United States, 192 F. 864 (6th Cir. 1911) (discussing pepper diluted
by corn); United States v. Frank, 189 F. 195 (S.D. Ohio 1911) (discussing lemon extract diluted
by alcohol and water); United States v. South Hero Creamery Ass'n, White & Gates 1142 (D. Vt.
1925) (discussing butter with less than 80 per cent milk-fat); United States v. Atlantic Macaroni
Co., White & Gates 793 (E.D.N.Y. 1917) (discussing macaroni dyed yellow to conceal
inferiority); United States v. German American Specialty Co., White & Gates 459 (S.D.N.Y.
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Nor did juries seem to have a problem understanding the rather technical
and scientific evidence.255
And even scientific evidence at the cutting edge-requiring an
understanding of the impact of chemicals at the cellular level-did not
flummox courts. For example, in a decision that would put today's judges
to shame, the court in Lexington Mill & Elevator Co. v. United States,

decided at the turn of the last century, dealt with the issue of whether
bleached flour is considered harmful. 256 The decision is astounding in
demonstrating the level of mastery of science.
Before reading the decision, it might be informative to note that the
nature of hemoglobin was first established by E. F. Hoppe-Seyler in
1857.25 The reaction between nitrite and hemoglobin was first studied
only about a decade before the decision, 25 and the quantitative relationship
enunciated in 1911, two years before the appellate decision.259

1913) (discussing eggs diluted by skim milk); United States v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 210 F.
148 (4th Cir. 1913) (discussing condensed skimmed milk diluted by sugar); United States v. Sixty
Barrels of Wine, 225 F. 846 (W.D. Mo. 1915) (considering claret wine diluted by pomace wine);
William Henning & Co. v. United States, 193 F. 52 (5th Cir. 1912) (evaluating tomato catsup
diluted by pumpkin); United States v. One Hundred Barrels of Vinegar, 188 F. 471 (D. Minn.
1911) (discussing cider vinegar diluted by distilled vinegar); United States v. 420 Sacks of Flour,
180 F. 518 (E.D. La. 1910) (addressing flour bleached to conceal inferiority).
255 See, e.g., United States v. 3998 Cases of Canned Tomatoes, White & Gates 1213 (D. Del.
1928) (revealing that jury failed to find that excess water had been added to canned tomatoes);
United States v. 4% Cases of Creme De Menthe, White & Gates 1191 (E.D. Mo. 1926) (failing
to find caffeine had been substituted in part for creme de menthe flavor non-alcoholic cocktail);
United States v. Barnet Creamery Ass'n, White & Gates 1149 (D. Vt. 1925) (failing to find butter
deficient in butterfat); United States v. 37 One Pound Packages of Colors, White & Gates 1165
(E.D. Pa. 1925) (failing to find that food colors had been diluted by paste); United States v.
Marmarelli, White & Gates 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (failing to find that defendants had diluted
olive oil with cottonseed oil); United States v. Potter, White & Gates 409 (E.D. N.C. 1912)
(failing to find that excess water was used in canning oysters); United States v. Heide, White &
Gates 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (failing to find that 5% glucose reduced the quality of almond paste).
256 See United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 202 F. 615, 621-22 (8th Cir. 1913),
rev'd 202 F. 615 (8th Cir. 1913), aff'd 232 U.S. 399 (1914).
257 See Andras Gedeon, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN MEDICINE: AN ILLUSTRATED
ACCOUNT BASED ON NINETY NINE LANDMARK PUBLICATIONS FROM FWE CENTURIES 268

(2007) (outlining ninety nine most significant discoveries in medical field).
258 See Daniel B. Kim-Shapiro et al., The Reaction Between Nitrite and Hemoglobin: The
Role of Nitrite in Hemoglobin-Mediated Hypoxic Vasodilation, 99 J. OF INORGANIC
BIOCHEMISTRY 237-46 (2005) (discussing historical studies and discovery of hemoglobin and
heme-compounds).
259 See Leon A. Greenberg et al., The Reaction of Hemoglobin with Nitrite, J. OF
BIOLOGICAL CHEMISTRY 665, 665 (1943) ("Although nitrite has been extensively used as an
agent for the formation of methemoglobin, the quantitative relations of the reaction appear to be
uncertain; three widely different values have been reported for the amount of methemoglobin
formed to nitrite utilized. The first statement of a quantitative relationship was made by Barcroft
and Miiller... in 1911."); see also Joseph Barcroft & Franz Miller, The Relation of Blood-flow
to Metabolism in the Submaxillary Gland, 44 J. PHYSIOL. 259, 259 (1912) (stating quantitative
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The Eighth Circuit court opinion is brought down here in
substantial measure, to demonstrate the extreme sophistication of
knowledge and understanding of the judiciary at the time:
We are not unmindful of the contention that the evidence
conclusively shows that our subjected to the bleaching
process is injurious to health in some degree, even if its
injurious effect is so slight as to be incapable of
observation, and that hence the instruction we have found
to be error was error without prejudice. This contention is
founded upon expert testimony as to the result from the
taking of nitrites into the human system. It is said that
nitrites taken into the human body act upon the coloring
matter of the red corpuscles of the blood so as to change
the hemoglobin of the blood into methemoglobin. In the
language of one of the chief chemical experts of the
government
this
effect
is
thus
described:
'In the blood stream there are red corpuscles, invisible to
the naked eye, which contain a red coloring substance
known as hemoglobin, when not combined with oxygen,
and when combined with oxygen forming a dissociable
compound, oxyhemoglobin.
In respiration,
the
hemoglobin contained in the red corpuscles of the venous
blood is brought into the lungs, where it having an affinity
for the oxygen, which is one of the gaseous constituents of
the air, combines with the oxygen to form oxyhemoglobin.
This oxyhemoglobin contained in the red blood corpuscles
is then conveyed, through the arterial system, to the
various parts of the body, and of the terminals of the
arterial system, passing through a mass of tissue, it gives
up its oxygen, to oxidize the tissues, or materials that may
be in solution there, to form carbon dioxide and to form
water, and this oxyhemoglobin is thereby reduced to the
condition of hemoglobin which is returned by the venous
system to the lungs, to be again oxygenated. Thatis where
the hemoglobin will again combine with oxygen to form

relationship). Even basic research on the compound was still being performed ten years after the
case was decided. See James M. Neill, Studies on the Oxidation-Reduction of Hemoglobin and
Methemoglobin: The Changes Induced by Pneumococci and by Sterile Animal Tissue, J.
EXPERIMENTAL MED. 299, 299-313 (1925), http://jem.rupress.org/content/41/2/299.full.pdf
(furthering studies on the reaction of hemoglobin with nitrite).

2016

DA UBERT DEBUNKED

oxyhemoglobin, and a given quantity of hemoglobin may
serve to carry a given quantity of oxygen to the system.
Now, however, if any of this hemoglobin is converted into
methemoglobin, which is a compound of oxygen with
hemoglobin, in which the oxygen is more firmly combined
than in the case of oxyhemoglobin, although the quantity
of oxygen is the same, the oxygen is so firmly attachedcombined with the hemoglobin-that the vital processes
are not sufficiently strong to separate the oxygen from the
hemoglobin, nor to use the oxygen to oxidize the tissue and
tissue material, to sustain life, and, consequently, it passes
through the circulation to the arterial system and the
venous system, and continues this cycle until, finally, it is
destroyed by the liver. Therefore, a certain quantity of the
hemoglobin is rendered inefficient.
It no longer
functionates as a carrier of oxygen to the system, serves, or
acts, as a foreign body in the blood circulation, and,
therefore, must be removed. As I have said before, an
extra strain is placed upon the liver, in order to remove it,
and an extra strain is placed upon the red blood marrow, in
adults, to regenerate the corpuscles, and to replace the
corpuscles of the hemoglobin that have been rendered
inactive by the action of nitrite, and the formation of
methemoglobin.
It is also said that the continued presence of nitrites in the
system does not develop and tolerance on the part of the
body or means of neutralizing its normal action. On the
other hand, it was proved that no injurious effect had ever
been observed from the use of bleached flour, although
such flour had been largely used; that nitrites in some or
greater amounts are frequently present in potable water,
bacon, ham, fruits, and certain vegetables, and even in the
saliva of both adults and children, and no evil result has
been detected; that urea usually present in saliva is, when
taken into the stomach, a neutralizer of nitrites, and is a
method by which nature averts harm from minute
quantities of nitrites so constantly taken into the system. In
this conflict of evidence it was essentially a matter for the
jury to find the fact under proper instructions. Expert
testimony is but evidence. In case of dispute the
controversy cannot be settled by the judicial knowledge
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of the court. It cannot be held that the evidence was so
conclusive in favor of the government as to warrant the
court in withdrawing this issue from the jury....
The mixture referred to in the first subdivision must be
held to include a chemical compound as well as a
mechanical mixture. While this does not accord with the
scientific definition of a mixture, yet in common
acceptation mixtures and compounds are not
discriminated. The evil intended to be remedied by the
statute is not limited to a mechanical mixture, but is
just as potent when the chemical union results from the
two substances with the deleterious effect intended to
be prevented by the act....
There was evidence that bleached flour did not improve
with age in the manner characteristic of unbleached flour,
nor did it, as the claimant contended, suddenly take on the
condition of properly aged flour which had not been
subjected to the bleaching process. That in dough made
from bleached flour the gluten never attained the toughness
found in dough from unbleached and properly aged flour,
and that this toughness was a valuable property in the
making of bread. In other words, that as an ultimate result
of the mixing of the flour with nitrogen peroxide gas the
bread-making quality had been injuriously affected. We
are not concerned with the opposing testimony. It was for
the jury to determine the fact, and the court did not err in
refusing to peremptorily instruct for the claimant so far as
the claim of adulteration was based on the first subdivision
before quoted.260
C. Scientific Literacy in the Law-Another Approach
Why courts relied on Frye or created the Dauberttests when other
standards of evidentiary acceptability were available remains a mystery. A
good ten plus years before Daubert, courts set out standards both for
evidence and for appellate review of such evidence as it pertained to health
and safety in workplaces where toxic diseases were commonplace, which
were commonsensical and easily applied: In American Textile
260

United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 202 F. at 621-22 (emphasis added)

(citations omitted).
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ManufacturersInstitute v. Donovan,26 1 all the court required-at least in an
administrative setting-was "the best available evidence" for standard
setting and "substantial evidence" for review.262 The court noted that:
[P]etitioners urge not only that OSHA must show that a
standard addresses a significant risk of material health
impairment, but also that OSHA must demonstrate that the
reduction in risk of material health impairment is
significant in light of the costs of attaining that reduction.
Respondentson the other hand contend that the Act
requires OSHA to promulgate standards that eliminate or
reduce such risks "to the extent such 263protection is
technologically and economically feasible.,
OSHA provides:
Agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which
most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the
basis of the best available evidence, that no employee
will suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the
hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his
264
working life.
The court held that:
[W]e have defined substantial evidence as "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." The reviewing court
must take into account contradictory evidence in the
record, but "the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
administrative agency's
finding from being supported by
265
substantial evidence.,

261
262
263
264

452 U.S. 490 (1981).
See id. at 490.
Id. at 506-07 (citations omitted).
Id. at 508 (emphasis added) (quoting Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §

655(b)(5)).
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Id. at 522-23 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Univ. Camera Corp. v.

NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) and Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Corp., 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)).
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D. How the Mighty Have Fallen
In the hundred years or so since the Muller and Coca-Cola cases
were heard by the Supreme Court, it appears that the facility in the legal
community to appreciate even simple mathematical concepts such as graph
reading has diminished to the point of non-existence.2 66 The flawed
interpretation of the RAND study results being promulgated and reliedwithout a hue and cry on the misuse of statistics and the misread of simple
graphs-is, itself, an illustration of the problem. 267 If lawyers cannot
determine the statistical slant given by the impartial authors of the RAND
study, how can they be trusted to ferret out statistical issues in evidence
preferred by an advocate? If the myriad of commentators who have argued
either that Daubertfavored one side or the other, recently culminating in an
"academic war" with one side advocating that a new "sufficiency" test be
utilized to address their claim of "favoritism" with others vehemently
disagreeing-not on the facts-but maintaining that Daubert is properly
doing its job (which we now see is not26the case), then how can we expect
judges to make appropriate decisions?
E. Conclusion: BING-ing science and the Universal Translatoror the Need
to Re-Define Science and the Scientific Method in Law
Certainly, these data highlight the importance of continuing
empirical research regarding the effect of rulings post-Daubertin both
Daubert and Frye jurisdictions; at present the data mysteriously stops circa
2000. But other important messages surface from this work as well.
Various important words surface in the American Textile case: "Relevant,"
"material harm," "significant health impairment," and "best available
evidence"; words, that along with traditional evidentiary concepts of
"competency, materiality and significance," should suffice to filter out
pseudo-science from the courtroom-from a legal perspective.269
From a scientific perspective, however, judges and lawyers must
have some level of basic scientific and mathematical competency before

266

See Jehuda Reinharz, 1985 Science in the Service of Politics: The Case of Chaim

Weizmann during the First World War, 396 THE ENG. HIST. REv. 572, 572 (1985). Complicated
patent cases were also heard by the courts, for example, the patent of Harvey (Chaim) Weizmann
regarding industrial production of acetone through the fermentation process of bacteria
Clostridium aceto-butylicum in 1914. See id.
267 See discussion supra Parts I.C., II.A. (discussing flaws in RAND data and providing
reanalysis).
268 See Green & Sanders, supra note 12, at 1 (arguing for need of sufficiency test); Twerski,
supra note 26, at 641 (arguing Daubert factors are effective).
269 See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 passim (1981).
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any tests can be administered. The failures in reading the RAND graphs
(generally taught at the seventh grade level) are illustrative. And while
conventional judicial education programs sponsor world-class scientists to
rub shoulders with the judiciary, such an approach is ill-suited to judicial
gatekeeping.
The objection that we do not expect judges to be scientists-as some
claim is required under Daubert-isvalid. In a day or a week, there is no
way even the most scientifically adept could learn the intricacies of
genetics or artificial intelligence. What judges can be taught in a day is the
meaning of "science." A weekend would suffice to teach the difference
between validity and reliability-two distinct scientific concepts-mangled
and comingled in footnote nine of Daubert.2 ° What they can be taught in
a week is some understanding of the scientific method and its limitations.
These are general principles that apply to all scientific evidence, even cases
not relying on science per se. As far as cases involving more sophisticated
or interdisciplinary material such as epidemiological and toxic tort cases,
which involve statistics, biostatistics, immunology, genetics, toxicology,
obstetrics, and more, at least the basics should be introduced in law school
as electives for students interested in pursuing these areas of law. Better
cross-examination would better help judges, and better understanding of
the basics helps everyone.
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993) ("In a case involving

scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.").
It is
imperative to note that scientific validity and scientific reliability are separate indices of the
plausibility and reproducibility (respectively) of the work. See supra note 10 and accompanying
text (explaining differences between concepts of validity and reliability).

